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Abstract: Recently [6], we presented an automatic technique for proving secrecy and authentica-
tion properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded
number of sessions. That work relies on an extension of Horn clauses, generalized Horn clauses,
designed to support unbounded lists, and on a resolution algorithm on these clauses. However,
in that previous work, we had to model protocols manually with generalized Horn clauses, which
is unpractical. In this work, we present an extension of the input language of ProVerif, a variant
of the applied pi calculus, to model protocols with lists of unbounded length. We give its formal
meaning, translate it automatically to generalized Horn clauses, and prove that this translation is
sound.
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Du pi calcul appliqué aux clauses de Horn pour les
protocoles qui utilisent des listes
Résumé : Nous avons récemment [6] présenté une technique automatique pour prouver des
propriétés de secret et d’authentification pour des protocoles cryptographiques qui manipulent
des listes de longueur non-bornée. Ce travail est fondé sur une extension des clauses de Horn,
les clauses de Horn généralisées, conçue pour traiter les listes non-bornées, et sur un algorithme
de résolution sur ces clauses. Cependant, dans ce travail précédent, nous devions modéliser les
protocoles manuellement avec des clauses de Horn généralisées, ce qui est compliqué en pratique.
Dans ce rapport, nous présentons une extension du langage d’entrée de ProVerif, une variante
du pi calcul appliqué, pour modéliser les protocoles avec des listes de longueur non-bornée.
Nous définissons sa signification formelle, le traduisons automatiquement en clauses de Horn
généralisées, et prouvons que cette traduction est correcte.
Mots-clés : Protocoles cryptographiques, vérification, pi calcul appliqué, clauses de Horn,
listes, XML
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1 Introduction
Security protocols rely on cryptography for securing communication on insecure networks such
as Internet. However, attacks are often found against protocols that were thought correct.
Furthermore, security flaws cannot be detected by testing since they appear only in the presence
of an attacker. Formal verification can then be used to increase the confidence in these protocols.
To ease formal verification, one often uses the symbolic, so-called Dolev-Yao model [10], which
considers cryptographic primitives as black boxes and messages as terms on these primitives. In
this work, we also rely on this model.
The formal verification of security protocols with fixed-size data structures has been exten-
sively studied. However, some protocols, for instance XML protocols of web services or some
group protocols, use more complex data structures, such as lists. The verification of protocols
that manipulate such data structures has been less studied and presents additional difficulties,
since these complex data structures add another cause of undecidability.
Recently [6], we started to extend the automatic verifier ProVerif [5] to protocols with lists
of unbounded length. ProVerif takes as input a protocol written in a variant of the applied pi
calculus [1], translates it into a representation in Horn clauses, and uses a resolution algorithm
to determine whether a fact is derivable from the clauses. One can then infer security properties
of the protocol. For instance, ProVerif uses a fact att(M) to mean that the attacker may have
the message M . If att(s) is not derivable from the clauses, then s is secret. The main goal of this
approach is to prove security properties of protocols without bounding the number of sessions of
the protocol.
In [6], we introduced generalized Horn clauses, to be able to represent lists of any length,
and we adapted the resolution algorithm of ProVerif to deal with these new clauses. Using
this algorithm, we can prove secrecy and authentication properties of protocols with lists of
any length, without bounding the number of sessions of the protocol. However, to use this
algorithm, one has to write the generalized Horn clauses that model the protocol manually,
which is delicate and error-prone. In this paper, our goal is to solve this problem by providing a
more convenient input language for protocols. More precisely, we extend the input language of
ProVerif to model protocols with lists of unbounded length. We give a formal meaning to the new
process calculus, by translating it to a variant of the applied pi calculus with a non-deterministic
choice operator. The obtained applied pi calculus process may contain infinite choices, with
one branch for each possible list length, thus it cannot be handled directly by automatic tools
such as ProVerif. Instead, we provide an automatic translation of the new process calculus to
generalized Horn clauses. We prove that this translation is sound, so that one can apply the
resolution algorithm of [6] to the generalized Horn clauses obtained by our translation, to prove
secrecy and authentication properties of the initial protocol. We illustrate our work on a small
protocol that relies on XML signatures; it could obviously be applied to other protocols such as
those considered in [6]. We do not expect any difficulty for implementing the translation from
the process calculus to generalized Horn clauses in our tool [6], but we did not have time to do
that yet.
Related Work The first approach considered for proving protocols with recursive data struc-
tures was interactive theorem proving: a recursive authentication protocol was studied for an un-
bounded number of participants, using Isabelle/HOL [14], and using rank functions and PVS [8].
However, this approach requires considerable human effort.
Truderung [16] showed a decidability result (in NEXPTIME) for secrecy in recursive protocols,
which include transformations of lists, for a bounded number of sessions. This result was extended
to a class of recursive protocols with XOR [12] in 3-NEXPTIME. Chridi et al [9] present an
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extension of the constraint-based approach in symbolic protocol verification to handle a class
of protocols (Well-Tagged protocols with Autonomous keys) with unbounded lists in messages.
They prove that the insecurity problem for Well-Tagged protocols with Autonomous keys is
decidable for a bounded number of sessions.
Several approaches were considered for verifying XML protocols [4, 15, 11, 3], by translating
them to the input format of a standard protocol verifier: the tool TulaFale [4] uses ProVerif as
back-end; Kleiner and Roscoe [15, 11] translate WS-Security protocols to FDR; Backes et al [3]
use AVISPA. All these approaches have little or no support for lists of unbounded length. For
instance, TulaFale has support for list membership with unbounded lists, but does not go further.
In [13], we showed that, for a certain class of Horn clauses, if secrecy is proved by ProVerif for
lists of length one, then secrecy also holds for lists of unbounded length. However, this work is
limited to secrecy and to protocols that treat all elements of lists uniformly. When this reduction
result does not apply, a different approach is needed: in our previous work [6], we proposed such
an approach.
Outline In the next section, we recall the process calculus used by ProVerif and we extend
it with the non-deterministic choice. We also introduce a running example and motivate the
necessity of a new process calculus to model protocols with lists of unbounded length. Section 3
defines the new process calculus. Section 4 gives the automatic translation of the new calculus
into generalized Horn clauses. In Sect. 5, we prove that this translation is sound. The proofs
and additional details are postponed to the appendix.
2 Motivation
ProVerif [5] takes as input a process written in a variant of the applied pi calculus [1]. ProVerif
then translates this process into an abstract representation by Horn clauses. It uses a resolution
algorithm to determine whether some facts are derivable from these clauses, and infer security
properties on the initial process. In this section, we recall the considered variant of the applied
pi calculus and show with a few examples that it is not sufficiently expressive in order to model
protocols with lists of unbounded length.
2.1 The Applied Pi Calculus with Non-deterministic Choice
The syntax of the considered variant of the applied pi calculus is defined in Figure 1. It assumes
an infinite set of names a, b, c, k, s, which represent atomic data items, such as keys or nonces,
and an infinite set of variables x, y, z. There are also function symbols for constructors (f) and
destructors (g), each with an arity. Constructors build new terms of the form f(M1, . . . ,Mn).
Therefore, messages are represented by terms M , N , which can be a variable, a name, or a
constructor application f(M1, . . . ,Mn). Destructors manipulate terms in processes, as explained
below.
Protocols are represented by processes P , Q, of the following forms:
• The output process out(M,N).P outputs the message N on the channel M and then
executes P .
• The input process in(M,x).P inputs a message on the channel M and then executes P
with x bound to the input message.
• The nil process 0 does nothing.
Inria
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M,N ::= terms
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k, s name





P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
(νa)P restriction
let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q destructor application
let pat = M in P else Q pattern-matching
event(e(M)).P event
P +Q internal choice
Figure 1: Syntax of the process calculus
• The process P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q.
• The replication !P represents an infinite number of copies of P in parallel.
• The restriction (νa)P creates a new name a and then executes P .
• The destructor application let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q tries to evaluate g(M1, . . . ,
Mn); if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed, else Q is exe-
cuted. More precisely, a destructor g is defined by a set def (g) of rewrite rules of the
form g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M where M1, . . . ,Mn,M are terms without free names, and the
variables of M also occur in M1, . . . ,Mn. Then g(M1, . . . ,Mn) evaluates to M if and only
if it reduces to M by a rewrite rule of def (g). Using constructors and destructors, one can
represent data structures and cryptographic operations. Here are two examples:
– The constructor pk builds a new public key pk (M) from a secret key M . The con-
structor sign is such that sign(M,N) represents the signature of M under the key N .
It has one corresponding destructor:
checksign(sign(x, y), pk (y), x) → x
Hence, checksign(S,PK ,M) checks if S is a correct signature sign(M, SK ) of message
M under the secret key SK corresponding to the public key PK = pk(SK ); if yes, it
returns the message M ; otherwise, it fails.
– A data constructor is a constructor f of arity n that comes with n associated destruc-
tors f−1i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), defined by rewrite rules f
−1
i (f(x1, . . . , xn)) → xi, so that the
arguments of f can be recovered. Data constructors are typically used to represent
data structures.
• The pattern-matching let pat = M in P else Q matches M with the pattern pat , and ex-
ecutes P when the matching succeeds and Q when it fails. The pattern pat can be a
variable x or a data constructor application f(pat1, . . . , patn). Patterns pat are linear,
that is, they never contain several occurrences of the same variable. Pattern-matching
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can be encoded using destructor application: let x = M in P else Q is an abbreviation for
let x = id(M) in P else Q, where the destructor id is defined by id(x) → x and let f(pat1,
. . . , patn) = M in P else Q is an abbreviation for
let x1 = f
−1
1 (M) in . . . let xn = f
−1
n (M) in
let pat1 = x1 in . . . let patn = xn in P else Q . . . else Q
else Q . . . else Q
where the variables x1, . . . , xn are fresh and the variables of pat1, . . . , patn do not occur in
Q.
• ProVerif models authentication as correspondence assertions, such as “if event e(x) has
been executed, then event e′(x) has been executed”. The process calculus provides an
instruction for executing such events: the process event(e(M)).P executes the event e(M),
then executes P .
• We add a construct for internal choice, which was not present in [5]: the process P + Q
behaves either as P or as Q, non-deterministically. This construct will be helpful for
defining our extension to lists.
The conditional if M = N then P else Q can be encoded as the destructor application let x =
equal(M,N) in P else Q where x does not occur in P and the destructor equal , defined by
equal(x, x) → x, succeeds if and only if its two arguments are equal. We often omit a trail-
ing 0.
The name a is bound in P in the process (νa)P . The variable x is bound in P in the processes
in(M,x).P and let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q. The variables of pat are bound in P in the
process let pat = M in P else Q. A process is closed if it has no free variables; it may have free
names. We denote by fn(P ) the free names of P .
The formal semantics of this calculus is defined either by a structural equivalence and a
reduction relations, in the style of [1], or by a reduction relation on semantic configurations, as
in [5]. These semantics are extended to the internal choice, by adding rules such that P + Q
reduces into P and also into Q.
2.2 Running Example
As a running example, we consider a simple protocol that relies on XML signatures [7, 6].
Elements in XML messages have a tag (e.g., Body, Signature) indicating their role, a unique
identifier so that they can be referenced in the rest of the message, and a content. In this
protocol, a client C sends to a server S an XML message containing a request Req in its body
(with tag Body), and a header (with tag Header) that contains a signature of the body, as shown
in Fig. 2. More precisely, this signature has tag Signature and consists of two components. The
first component, SignedInfo, is a list of references to the elements of the message that are signed,
designated by their identifier and accompanied by a hash of their content computed with the
hash function SHA-1. The list SignedInfo should include a reference to the body. The second
component is the signature of SignedInfo under the secret key skC of the client. The server
processes the message and checks the signature before authorizing the request given in the Body:
if SignedInfo contains a reference to an element with tag Body and this element is the body of
the message, then he authorizes the request.
Inria






<DigestValue> hash of the body </DigestValue>
</Reference>
<Reference URI="#x1">




<SignatureValue> signature of SignedInfo with key skC </SignatureValue>
</Signature>
</Header>
<Body Id="#theBody"> request </Body>
</Envelope>
Figure 2: An XML document carrying a digital signature
2.3 Need for a New Process Calculus
We would like to model our running example with the process calculus introduced in Sect. 2.1.
However, since the length of the header and the length of the list of references of the signature
can be different from a document to another, we encounter several problems.
First, since the server of our example accepts messages containing any number of headers,
we need lists of variable length to model the expected message. We could obviously model lists
with constructors for :: and []. However, with such a model, functions that manipulate lists
are typically recursive. Hence they are difficult to analyze automatically, because one needs to
guess inductive invariants. In the case of ProVerif, such a model would lead to non-termination.
Therefore, we rather add a new construct to the syntax of terms, list(i ≤ L,Mi), for the list of
elements Mi with index i in the set {1, . . . , L}.
When we receive a list, we often pattern-match it. Two situations may happen: If the desired
length L of the list is known in advance, we use the process let list(i ≤ L, yi) = x in P else 0,
which binds yi (i ≤ L) to the elements of the list x. Otherwise, the length is determined by the
received list. Instead of introducing a primitive that performs the match in this case, we split it
into two more primitive constructs: first, we introduce the construct choose L in P that chooses
non-deterministically a bound L and then executes P ; then we can use the previous matching
construct with the chosen length L. It succeeds only when L is the length of the received list.
In our example, we assume that the received XML message is already parsed into a pair,
containing as first component a list of triplets (tag, identifier, corresponding content) and as a
second component the content of the body. Hence the beginning of the process PS that describes
the server will be:
PS := in(c, x).choose L in
let (list(j ≤ L, (tagj , id j , cont j)), w) = x in . . .
Next, the server has to check the signature, before authorizing the request he receives. He
has to verify that the list contains a tag tagk equal to Signature and that contk contains a
correct signature. In other words, the server has to choose a k and test whether tagk is equal to
Signature and contk contains a correct signature. We introduce a new process choose k ≤ L in P
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that chooses non-deterministically an index k ∈ {1, . . . , L} and then executes P . This construct
allows us perform a lookup in a list.
Hence, we can represent the beginning of the check of the signature as:
choose k ≤ L in
if tagk = Signature then
let (sinfo, sinfosign) = contk in . . .
We give the final representation of this protocol in our new process calculus in Sect. 3.2.
Suppose now that we apply a destructor g(ri, si) to each element yi of a list list(i ≤ L, yi).
Since L is not fixed, we cannot model this destructor application as let y1 = g(r1, s1) in . . . let
yL = g(rL, sL) in P else Q . . . else Q. Hence we introduce a new destructor application let for
all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, xi1,...,ih = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q that computes g(M1, . . . ,Mn) for
each i1 ∈ {1, . . . , L1}, . . . , ih ∈ {1, . . . , Lh} in one step. This construct allows us to apply the
destructor g to all elements of the list, as in the ML function List.map.
Finally, suppose that we want to model a simple protocol in which L participants send their
own identity to a chair C. (This happens in group protocols, such as the Asokan-Ginzborg
protocol [2], that describe the exchange of messages between an unbounded number of partici-
pants.) Since we have L participants we would like to describe each participant with a process
Ai and replicate Ai L times. Moreover, we may need to create L identifiers ai, one for each
participant Ai. We solve these two issues by introducing two new constructs: Πi≤LP and
(for all i ≤ L, νai)P . The first one represents L copies of P running in parallel; the second one
creates L names a1, . . . , aL and then executes P .
3 Generalized Process Calculus
This section formally defines the new process calculus that we introduce to represent protocols
with lists of unbounded lengths. We will refer to this new process calculus as the generalized
process calculus.
3.1 Syntax and Type System
The syntax of the generalized process calculus is described in Fig. 3. Terms are enriched with
several new constructs. Variables may have indices xι1,...,ιh , and so do names aι; these indices
ι are built from index variables and application of functions on indices. Lists of fixed length
are represented by a data constructor 〈MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n 〉 for each length n. We use the construct
list(i ≤ L,MG) to represent lists of variable length L: list(i ≤ L,MG) represents intuitively
the list 〈MG{1/i}, . . . ,MG{L/i}〉. We use ĩ to represent a tuple of indices i1, . . . , ih, and we
use the notation x̃i for xi1,...,ih and list (̃i ≤ L̃,M
G) for list(i1 ≤ L1, list(i2 ≤ L2, . . . , list(ih ≤
Lh,M
G) . . . )).
Processes are also enriched with new constructs:
• The indexed replication Πi≤LP
G represents L copies of PG in parallel. It may represent L
participants of a group protocol, where L is not fixed.
• The restriction (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG creates L names a1, . . . , aL and then executes PG.
The names a1, . . . , aL may for instance be a secret key for each member of a group of L
participants.
• The destructor application let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, xi1,...,ih = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in
PG else QG tries to evaluate g(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) for each i1 ∈ {1, . . . , L1}, . . . , ih ∈ {1, . . . ,
Inria
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ι ::= index terms
i index variable
φ(ι1, . . . , ιh) function application
patG := patterns
xi1,...,ih variable
f(patG1 , . . . , pat
G
n ) data constructor
list(i ≤ L, patG) list pattern
MG, NG ::= terms
xι1,...,ιh variable (h ≥ 0)
f(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) function application
a name
aι indexed name
list(i ≤ L,MG) list constructor









(for all i ≤ L, νai)PG restriction
let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, xi1,...,ih = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG
destructor application
let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, pat
G = MG in PG else QG pattern matching
event(e(MG)).PG event
choose L in PG bound choice
choose k ≤ L in PG index choice
choose φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L′] in PG function choice
Figure 3: Syntax of the generalized process calculus
Lh}; if all these evaluations succeed, then xi1,...,ih is bound to the obtained result for each
i1, . . . , ih and P
G is executed, else QG is executed.
• The pattern matching let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, pat
G = MG in PG else QG matches
MG with the pattern patG for each i1 ∈ {1, . . . , L1}, . . . , ih ∈ {1, . . . , Lh} and executes P
G
when the matchings succeed, QG otherwise. The pattern patG can be a variable xi1,...,ih , a
data constructor application f(patG1 , . . . , pat
G
h ), or a list of variable length list(i ≤ L, pat
G);
the latter pattern is essential to be able to decompose lists without fixing their length, since
we do not have destructors to perform this decomposition. When a variable occurs in the
pattern patG in the process let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih′ ≤ Lh′ , list(ih′+1 ≤ Lh′+1, . . . list(ih ≤
Lh, pat
G) . . . ) = MG in PG else QG, its indices must be i1, . . . , ih. Patterns are linear.
• The bound choice choose L in PG chooses non-deterministically a bound L and then exe-
cutes PG. For example, in the process choose L in let list(i ≤ L, yi) = x in PG else 0, the
non-deterministic choice of the bound L allows us to bind yi (i ≤ L) to the elements of the
list x, without knowing the length of the list in advance.
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• The index choice choose k ≤ L in PG chooses non-deterministically an index k ∈ {1, . . . , L}
and then executes PG. In particular, this construct allows us to perform a lookup in a list.
For example, let list(i ≤ L, xi) = z in choose k ≤ L in if f(xk) = MG then PG else 0 looks
for an element xk of the list z such that f(xk) = M
G.
• The function choice choose φ : [1, L1]×· · ·× [1, Lh] → [1, L′] in PG chooses non-determinis-
tically an index function φ : {1, . . . , L1}× · · ·×{1, . . . , Lh} → {1, . . . , L} and then executes
PG. For instance, this construct allows us to verify that the elements of a list are a subset
of the elements of another list, by non-deterministically choosing the mapping between the
indices of the two lists, as we do in Sect. 3.2.
We will use the notation for all ĩ ≤ L̃ instead of for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, and simply omit
“for all ” when h = 0. As for the process calculus of Sect. 2.1, we can encode the process
if for all ĩ ≤ L̃,MG = NG then PG else QG in the generalized calculus as let x = equal(list (̃i ≤
L̃,MG), list (̃i ≤ L̃, NG)) in PG else QG, where x does not occur in PG. The “else” branch may
be omitted when it is “else 0”.
This process calculus provides list manipulation constructs that allow us, for instance, to look
up an element in a list and to apply a function to all elements of a list (as in List.map). It
also has limitations: while we can look up several elements of a list and handle these elements
differently, we can require a specific order of these elements in the list only if the list has a fixed
length; the order is abstracted away when the length is not fixed.
We also define a simple type system for the generalized process calculus, to guarantee that the
indices of all variables vary in the appropriate interval. In the type system, the type environment
Γ is a list of type declarations:
• i : [1, L] means that i is of type [1, L], that is, intuitively, the value of index i can vary
between 1 and the value of the bound L;
• φ : [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] means that the function φ expects as input h indices of
types [1, L1], . . . , [1, Lh] and computes an index of type [1, L];
• x
_
: [1, L1]×· · ·×[1, Lh] means that the variable x expects indices of types [1, L1], . . . , [1, Lh];
we write x
_
: [ ] when x expects no index (that is, h = 0);
• a
_
: [1, L] means that the name a expects an index of type [1, L], and a
_
: [ ] means that
the name a expects no index.
The type system defines the judgment Γ ⊢ PG, which means that PG is well-typed in the type
environment Γ. The typing rules are detailed in Appendix D.
We have notions of bound indices i, functions φ, variables x, names a, and bounds L. For
example, the index k is bound in PG in the process choose k ≤ L in PG. In the pattern matching
let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, pat
G = MG in PG else QG, the indices i1, . . . , ih are bound in
patG = MG, but not in PG or QG. The bound L is bound in PG in the process choose L in PG.
A closed process has no free bounds, indices, functions, and variables. It may have free names.
We suppose that all processes are well-typed. A closed process PG0 is typed as follows: Γ0 ⊢ P
G
where Γ0 = {a_ : [ ] | a ∈ fn(PG)}.
3.2 Example
The representation of our running example in our process calculus is given in Fig. 4. We repre-
sent an XML message as a pair, containing as first component a list of triplets (tag, identifier,
corresponding content) and as second component the content of the body. The client process PC
Inria
From the Applied Pi Calculus to Horn Clauses 11
PC := event(b(Req)).out(c, (〈(Signature, ids, (〈(idb, sha1 (Req))〉,
sign((〈(idb, sha1 (Req))〉, skC)))), (Body, idb,Req)〉,Req)))
PS := in(c, x).choose L in
let (list(j ≤ L, (tagj , id j , contj)), w) = x in
choose k ≤ L in
if tagk = Signature then
let (sinfo, sinfosign) = contk in
let z = checksign(sinfosign , pkC , sinfo) in
choose L′ in choose φ : [1, L′] → [1, L] in
if sinfo = list(l ≤ L′, (idφ(l), sha1 (contφ(l)))) then
choose d ≤ L′ in
if tagφ(d) = Body then if contφ(d) = w then event(e(w))
P := (νskC)let pkC = pk (skC) in out(c, pkC).(!PC |!PS)
Figure 4: Representation of our running example
first executes an event b(Req), meaning that he starts the protocol with a request Req. Then he
builds his message and sends it on the public channel c. We suppose that the only element signed
by the client is the Body. As explained in Sect. 2.3, we model the message received by the server
as (list(j ≤ L, (tagj , id j , cont j)), w), where tagj , id j , and cont j are variables representing tags,
identifiers, and contents respectively and w is the variable for the body. Therefore, the server
process PS receives on channel c the document x consisting of list(j ≤ L, (tagj , id j , contj)) to-
gether with the body w. Then he looks for an element with tag tagk = Signature and tries to
match the corresponding content contk to (sinfo, sinfosign), where sinfosign is the signature of
sinfo under the secret key skC . He checks that sinfo is a list of references to elements of the
message list(l ≤ L′, (idφ(l), sha1 (contφ(l)))), and that in this list, there is an element with tag
tagφ(d) = Body and with content contφ(d) equal to the content of the body w. When all checks
succeed, he authorizes the request w, which is modeled by the event e(w). Our goal is to show
that, if the server authorizes a request w, then the client has sent this request, that is, if event
e(w) is executed, then event b(w) has been executed.
3.3 Translation to the Applied Pi Calculus
We define the meaning of a generalized process by translating it into a corresponding standard
process. To define this translation, we need an environment that gives a value to each free bound,
index, and index function of the process.
Definition 1. Given a generalized process Γ ⊢ PG, an environment T for Γ ⊢ PG is a function
that associates:
• to each bound L free in PG or that appears in Γ, an integer LT ;
• to each index i such that i : [1, L] ∈ Γ, an index iT ∈ {1, . . . , LT };
• to each index function φ such that φ : [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] ∈ Γ, a function
φT : {1, . . . , LT1 } × · · · × {1, . . . , L
T
h } → {1, . . . , L
T }.
We write T [i1 7→ v1, . . . , ih 7→ vh] for the environment that associates to indices i1, . . . , ih
the values v1, . . . , vh respectively and that maps all other values like T . In order to abbreviate
notations, we write:
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• T [̃i 7→ ṽ] instead of T [i1 7→ v1, . . . , ih 7→ vh];
• ṽ ≤ L̃T instead of ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , h}, vj ∈ {1, . . . , LTj };
• ĩ : L̃ instead of i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh];
• x
_
: L̃ instead of x
_








Given an environment T for Γ ⊢ PG, the generalized process PG is translated into the
standard process PGT defined as follows. The translation of an index term ι such that Γ ⊢ ι : [1, L]
is an integer ιT ∈ {1, . . . , LT } defined as follows:
ιT =
{
iT if ι = i
φT (ιT1 , . . . , ι
T
h ) if ι = φ(ι1, . . . , ιh)






f(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n )





list(i ≤ L,MG)T = 〈MGT [i7→1], . . . ,MGT [i7→L
T ]〉
The translation of list(i ≤ L,MG) is a list of length LT . Patterns patG are translated exactly in
the same way as terms MG.
Finally, the translation of a generalized process is defined as follows and explained below.
• (out(MG, NG).PG)T = out(MGT , NGT ).PGT .
• (in(MG, x).PG)T = in(MGT , x).PGT .
• 0T = 0.
• (PG | QG)T = PGT | QGT .
• (!PG)T = !PGT .
• (Πi≤LP
G)T = PGT [i7→1] | · · · | PGT [i7→L
T ].
• ((νa)PG)T = (νa)PGT .
• ((for all i ≤ L, νai)PG)T = (νaL
T




• (let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . .M
G
n ) in P
G else QG)T = let E1 in . . . let El in P
T else





1 , . . . ,M
GT ′
n ) | T
′ = T [̃i 7→ ṽ], ṽ ≤
L̃T }.
• (let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, patG = MG in PG else QG)T = let E1 in . . . let El in PT else QT . . . else




| T ′ = T [̃i 7→ ṽ], ṽ ≤ L̃T }.
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ι ::= index terms
i index variable
φ(ι1, . . . , ιh) function application
pG ::= clause terms
xι1,...,ιh variable (h ≥ 0)
f(pG1 , . . . , p
G
n ) function application
aL1,...,Lhι1,...,ιh [p
G
1 , . . . , p
G
n ] indexed names













E ::= {E1, . . . , En} set of equations
RG ::= FG1 ∧ · · · ∧ F
G
n ∧ E ⇒ pred(p
G
1 , . . . , p
G
l ) generalized Horn clauses
Figure 5: Syntax of generalized Horn clauses
• (event(e(MG)).PG)T = event(e(MGT )).PGT .
• (choose L in PG)T = PGT [L 7→1] + · · ·+ PGT [L 7→n] + · · · .
• (choose k ≤ L in PG)T = PGT [k 7→1] + · · ·+ PGT [k 7→L
T ].
• (choose φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L′] in PG)T = PGT [φ 7→φ1] + · · ·+ PGT [φ 7→φl], where
{φ1, . . . , φl} = {φ | φ : {1, . . . , L
T
1 } × · · · × {1, . . . , L
T
h} → {1, . . . , L
T}}.
In most cases, a construct of the generalized process calculus is translated into the correspond-
ing construct of the standard process calculus. The translation of (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG cre-
ates LT names and then executes PGT . The translation of the process let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i =
g(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG computes g(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) and stores it in x̃i, for all values of
the indices ĩ . We define the translation of the pattern matching similarly. The choice processes
are translated into a non-deterministic choice between all the values that L, i, or φ can assume.
The translation of the process choose L in PG is an infinite process, which cannot be verified by
ProVerif; our work solves this problem, by providing a verification algorithm that works directly
on the generalized process calculus.
A closed process PG can be translated in the empty environment, named T0.
4 Translation into Generalized Horn Clauses
ProVerif translates a protocol written in the process calculus into a set of Horn clauses. In
this section, we adapt this translation in order to translate the generalized process calculus into
generalized Horn clauses, which extend Horn clauses to lists and were introduced in [6]. We first
recall the syntax of these clauses.
4.1 Syntax of Generalized Horn Clauses
The syntax of these clauses is defined in Fig. 5. Clause terms pG represent messages: vari-
ables may have indices xι1,...,ιh ; these indices ι are defined as in the process calculus. The term
RR n° 8823
14 Miriam Paiola & Bruno Blanchet
f(pG1 , . . . , p
G
n ) represents constructor application. The clause term a
L1,...,Lh
ι1,...,ιh
[pG1 , . . . , p
G
n ] repre-
sents a fresh name a indexed by ι1, . . . , ιh in [1, L1], . . . , [1, Lh] respectively: fresh names are
considered as functions of previous messages and indices, in order to distinguish names created
in different runs. The construct list(i ≤ L, pG) represents lists of variable length L.
Facts are represented by
∧
ĩ≤L̃
pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ). The facts pred(p
G
1 , . . . , p
G
l ) are as follows:
message(pG, p′G) means that the message p′G may appear on channel pG; att(pG) means that
the attacker may have the message pG; m-event(pG) means that the event pG must have been
executed; event(pG) means that the event pG may have been executed. For instance, to prove
the correspondence “if event e(x) has been executed, then event e′(x) has been executed”, we
use the predicate m-event for event e′, to have an actual guarantee that e′ has been executed,
and we use the predicate event for event e. The set of equations E serves to remember equalities
between terms. Keeping equations is especially useful when they cannot be immediately used
to infer the value of some variables and substitute them in the rest of clause. For instance,
the equation xi
.
= pG does not determine the value of all instances of xι, because the equation
holds for a single index i and not for all indices, so the equation remains for future use. The
clause FG1 ∧ · · · ∧ F
G
n ∧ E ⇒ pred(p
G
1 , . . . , p
G
l ) means that, if the facts F
G
1 , . . . , F
G
n and the
equations in E hold, then the fact pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ) also holds. The conclusion of a clause does
not contain a conjunction: we can simply leave the indices of pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ) free to mean that
pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ) can be concluded for any value of these indices. We use H
G for hypothesis and
CG for conclusions.
These clauses are simplified with respect to [6]: in [6], we considered conjunctions over ar-
bitrary subsets of [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] and equations on indices. These two features appear
during the resolution algorithm on generalized Horn clauses, but are not needed in the initial
clauses, so we omit them here. We still introduce two minor extensions with respect to [6]: we
consider names with any number of indices instead of just 0 or 1 index, and predicates of any
arity instead of just arity 1. (The predicate message has arity 2.) It is straightforward to extend
the resolution algorithm of [6] to this more general situation.
Much like generalized processes, generalized Horn clauses are typed, to make sure that indices
vary in the appropriate interval. The type system is detailed in [6, long version] and recalled
in Appendix B. The judgment Γ ⊢ RG means that the clause RG is well-typed in the type
environment Γ.
A generalized Horn clause represents several Horn clauses: given an environment T that gives
values of the bounds L, functions φ, and free indices i that occur in a generalized Horn clause
RG, the clause RG corresponds to a certain Horn clause, denoted RGT . A formal definition of
this correspondence is given in [6] and recalled in Appendix C. When RG is a set of well-typed
generalized Horn clauses, we define RGT = {RGT | Γ ⊢ RG ∈ RG, T is an environment for
Γ ⊢ RG}, the set of all Horn clauses corresponding to clauses in RG.
4.2 Translation
We define the translation of the generalized process calculus into generalized Horn clauses, by
giving the clauses for the attacker and those for the protocol.
Clauses for the Attacker. Initially the attacker has all the names in a set S, hence the
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for each constructor f of arity n,
att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) ⇒ att(f(x1, . . . xn))
(Rf)
for each destructor g, for each rule g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def (g),
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) ⇒ att(M)
(Rg)
∧
i∈[1,M ] att(xi) ⇒ att(list(j ≤ M,xj)) (Rf-list)
att(list(j ≤ M,xj)) ⇒ att(xi) (Rg-list)
message(x, y) ∧ att(x) ⇒ att(y) (Rl)
att(x) ∧ att(y) ⇒ message(x, y) (Rs)
Clause (Rn) represents the ability of the attacker to create fresh names: all fresh names that the
attacker may create are represented by the names b[x] for any x. Clauses (Rf) and (Rg) mean
that, if the attacker has some terms, then he can apply constructors and destructors to them.
The clauses (Rf-list) and (Rg-list) similarly allow the attacker to build and decompose lists of
any length; these clauses come with the introduction of lists, while other attacker clauses are
standard. Clause (Rl) means that if the attacker has a channel x then he can listen on it and
clause (Rs) means that the attacker can send messages in all the channels he has.
Clauses for the Protocol. The protocol is represented by a closed process PG0 . To compute
the clauses, we assume that the bound names in PG0 have been renamed so that they are pairwise
distinct and distinct from free names of PG0 .
In the clauses, we associate a session identifier to each replication; this session identifier
takes a different value in each copy of the replicated process. We represent fresh names as
functions of the session identifiers, received messages, and indices bound above the restriction
that creates the considered name, so that distinct names are represented by distinct terms. To
formalize this encoding of names, we first instrument the process PG0 by labeling each repli-
cation !PG with a distinct session identifier s, so that it becomes !sPG, and labeling each
restriction (for all i ≤ L, νai) with the clause term that corresponds to the fresh name ai,
aL,L1,...,Lhi,i1,...,ih [x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ], where x1, . . . , xn are the variables that store the messages re-
ceived in inputs above (for all i ≤ L, νai) in PG0 , s1, . . . , sn′ are the session identifiers that label
replications above (for all i ≤ L, νai) in the instrumentation of PG0 and i1, . . . , ih and L1, . . . , Lh
are the indices that label indexed replications above (for all i ≤ L, νai) in P
G
0 . The construct
(νa) is instrumented in the same way, so that it becomes (νa : aL1,...,Lhi1,...,ih [x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ]).
We denote the instrumentation of PG0 by instr
G(PG0 ).
The translation [[PG]]ρGHGEΓ of a well-typed instrumented process ΓP ⊢ PG is a set of
clauses, where the environment ρG is a mapping that associates each name and variable, possibly
with indices, to a clause term, HG is a sequence of facts message(·, ·) and m-event(·), E is a set
of equations, and Γ is a type environment for generalized Horn clauses. The hypothesis HG
collects all the messages that must be received and events that must be executed in order to
reach the current process PG. The set of equations E collects all equations that must hold to
reach the current process PG. The environment Γ serves in building the environment in which
the generated clauses are well-typed.
The mapping ρG is extended into a substitution that maps terms MG to clause terms pG =
ρG(MG), by replacing each name and variable with the corresponding clause term, as follows:
ρG(xι̃) = p
G{ι̃/̃i} if ρG(x̃i) = p
G
ρG(f(MG1 , . . . ,M
G
n )) = f(ρ
G(MG1 ), . . . , ρ
G(MGn ))
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ρG(aι) = p
G{ι/i} if ρG(ai) = p
G
ρG(list(i ≤ L,MG)) = list(i ≤ L, ρG(MG)) if i /∈ fi(im(ρG))
where fi is the set of free indices. The side condition i /∈ fi(im(ρ)) in the last formula can be
guaranteed by renaming i if needed; it avoids the capture of bound indices.
The translation [[PG]]ρGHGEΓ is then defined as follows, by induction on the syntax of PG:
• [[out(MG, NG).PG]]ρGHGEΓ =
[[PG]]ρGHGEΓ ∪ {Γ ⊢ HG ∧ E ⇒ message(ρG(MG), ρG(NG))}.
• [[in(MG, x).PG]]ρGHGEΓ =
[[PG]](ρG[x 7→ x])(HG ∧message(ρG(MG), x))E(Γ, x
_
: [ ]).
• [[0]]ρGHGEΓ = ∅.
• [[PG | QG]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]]ρGHGEΓ ∪ [[QG]]ρGHGEΓ.




G]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]]ρGHGE(Γ, i : [1, L]).
• [[(νa : aL̃
ĩ
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]](ρG[a 7→ aL̃
ĩ
[ρG(x1), . . . , ρ
G(xn),
ρG(s1), . . . , ρ
G(sn′)] ])H
GEΓ.
• [[(for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i





[ρG(x1), . . . , ρ
G(xn), ρ
G(s1), . . . , ρ
G(sn′)] ])H
GEΓ.
• [[let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . .M
G
n ) in P
G else QG]]ρGHGEΓ =
[[QG]]ρGHGEΓ ∪ [[PG]](ρG[x̃i 7→ p
′G])HG(E ∪ E ′)Γ′,
where p′G, E ′, and Γ′ are defined as follows. Let g(p1, . . . , pn) → p be the rewrite rule
in def (g). The rewrite rule g(p′G1 , . . . , p
′G
n ) → p
′G is obtained from g(p1, . . . , pn) → p
by replacing all variables y of this rule with fresh variables with indices ĩ: y′
ĩ
. Then










= ρG(MGn )} and Γ





: L̃ for each variable y′
ĩ




• [[let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, patG = MG in PG else QG]]ρGHGEΓ = [[QG]]ρGHGEΓ ∪ [[PG]](ρG[x̃i′ 7→






= ρG(MG)})Γ′, where Γ′ is Γ extended for
the variables in patG: if ĩ : L̃ ⊢ patG  Γ1, then Γ
′ = Γ,Γ1.
• [[event(e(MG)).PG]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]]ρG(HG ∧m-event(e(ρG(MG))))EΓ ∪ {Γ ⊢ HG ∧ E ⇒
event(e(ρG(MG)))}.
• [[choose L in PG]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]]ρGHGEΓ.
• [[choose k ≤ L in PG]]ρGHGEΓ = [[PG]]ρGHGE(Γ, k : [1, L]).
• [[choose φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L
′] in PG]]ρGHGEΓ =
[[PG]]ρGHGE(Γ, φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L′]).
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The translation of an output out(MG, NG).PG adds a clause, meaning that the reception of the
messages in HG can produce the output in question. The translation of an input in(MG, x).PG
is the translation of PG with the concatenation of the input to HG. The translation of 0 is
empty, as this process does nothing. The translation of the parallel composition PG | QG is
the union of the translation of PG and QG. The translation of the replication adds the session
identifier to ρG; as the clauses can be applied many times, replication is otherwise ignored.
In the previous cases, the translation is similar to the one of the standard process calculus
to Horn clauses, given in [5] and recalled in Appendix A.2. The translation of the process
(for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G extends ρG to the name ai for all possible
values of i ∈ {1, . . . , L}: it replaces the name ai with the corresponding clause term that depends
on previously received messages and on session identifiers of replications above the restriction.
The translation of the destructor application let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . .M
G
n ) in P
G else QG
is the union of the clauses for the case where the destructor succeeds and for the case where
it fails. To generate clauses in the success case, we restrict ourselves to destructors defined
by a single rewrite rule g(pG1 , . . . , p
G
n ) → p
G, the most common situation. We transform it into
g(p′G1 , . . . , p
′G
n ) → p
′G by renaming variables to fresh variables with indices ĩ, so that they can take
different values for different indices ĩ. Then the destructor application succeeds when the instance
of g(MG1 , . . .M
G
n ) obtained during execution reduces by the rewrite rule g(p
′G
1 , . . . , p
′G
n ) → p
′G
for all ĩ ≤ L̃, that is, for all j ≤ n and ĩ ≤ L̃, instances of ρG(MGj ) and p
′G
j are equal. Instead





= ρ(MGj ) for every j ≤ n to E and
extend ρG to the variable x̃i. The translation of a pattern matching is similar. The translation
of an event adds the hypothesis m-event(e(ρG(MG))) to HG, meaning that PG can be executed
only if the event has been executed first. Furthermore, it adds a clause, meaning that the event
is triggered when all conditions in HG are true. Finally, the type environment Γ is extended
with the chosen index or function in the choice processes and in the indexed replication; this is
sufficient since the chosen bound, index, or function can take any value in the generalized Horn
clauses.
Summary. Let ρ0 = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(PG0 )}. The set of generalized Horn clauses correspond-





= [[instrG(PG0 )]]ρ0∅∅∅ ∪ {att(a[ ]) | a ∈ S}
∪ {(Rn), (Rf), (Rg), (Rf-list), (Rg-list), (Rl), (Rs)}
where S is the set of names initially known by the attacker.
In our running example, the process PS is translated into the following clause:

























= w} ⇒ event(e(w))
which means that the server process PS executes event e(w) when it has received a message x that
satisfies all the checks. This clause will be simplified by the simplification algorithm presented
in [6].
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5 Soundness of the Generalized Horn Clauses
In this section, we relate the generalized Horn clauses generated from a closed well-typed gener-
alized process Γ0 ⊢ P
G
0 , to the Horn clauses generated from P
GT0
0 , to show that our generated
Horn clauses are correct. As a consequence, we show that we can use our clauses to prove two
security properties: secrecy of a term M , meaning that the adversary cannot compute M , and
authentication, modeled as “if event e(x) has been executed, then event e′(x) has been executed”.
Let us recall how these properties are proven for a standard process P0. We first rename the
bound names of P0 so that they are pairwise distinct and distinct from free names of P0 and
from names that occur in the considered security property (that is, in M for the secrecy of M).
This renaming is important because bound names are also used as function symbols in terms in
the generated clauses. We make an exception for the construct P + Q: the bound names in P
may be the same as those in Q. This is correct because P and Q cannot be both executed with
the same session identifiers. We say that the renamed process, denoted P ′0, is a suitable renaming
of P0. Next, we generate clauses RP ′
0
,S corresponding to P
′
0 and to an adversary with initial
knowledge S, as defined in [5] and recalled in Appendix A.2. (The extension to the internal
choice is straightforward and is given in Appendix A.2.) Let Fme be any set of facts of the form
m-event(p). This set is the set of events allowed to be executed. It is useful for correspondences,
but could be omitted as well as events for secrecy. Further details on this set can be found in [5,
Sect. 4]. Finally, we use the following two applications of [5, Theorem 1] to prove the desired
security properties:
Theorem 1 (Secrecy). Let M be a term. Let p be the clause term obtained by replacing names
a with a[ ] in M . Let P ′0 be a suitable renaming of P0. If att(p) is not derivable from RP ′0,S∪Fme
for any Fme, then P0 preserves the secrecy of M from adversaries with initial knowledge S.
Theorem 2 (Authentication). Let P ′0 be a suitable renaming of P0. Suppose that, for all Fme,
for all p, if event(e(p)) is derivable from RP ′
0
,S ∪ Fme, then m-event(e
′(p)) ∈ Fme. Then P0
satisfies the correspondence “if e(x) has been executed, then e′(x) has been executed” against
adversaries with initial knowledge S.
We can now prove the soundness of the generalized Horn clauses for PG0 . We assume that
the bound names in PG0 have been renamed so that they are pairwise distinct and distinct from
free names of PG0 and from names that occur in the considered security property. The bound
names in PGT00 need not be pairwise distinct, so we first need to rename them, before generating
the Horn clauses. Hence, we define a function Tren that combines the translation PGT with that
renaming of bound names.
Definition 2. Given a well-typed generalized process Γ ⊢ PG, an environment T for Γ ⊢ PG,
and a list of indices ĩ ≤ L̃, let Tren be defined by:
• Tren(Πi≤LP
G, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) = Tren(PG, T [i 7→ 1], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)) | · · · | Tren(PG, T [i 7→ LT ],
(̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L));
• Tren((νa)PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) = (νaL̃
T
ĩT




• Tren((for all i ≤ L, νai)PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) = (νa
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT
) . . . (νaL
T ,L̃T
LT ,̃iT








• In all other cases, Tren(PG, T,≤ L̃) is defined like PGT except that it recursively calls
Tren(P ′G, T,≤ L̃) instead of P ′GT on the subprocesses. For instance, Tren(choose k ≤
L in PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) = Tren(PG, T [k 7→ 1], ĩ ≤ L̃) + · · ·+Tren(PG, T [k 7→ LT ], ĩ ≤ L̃).
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Figure 6: Basic idea of Theorem 3
The next lemma shows that Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) renames the names of PGT as desired. It is
proved in Appendix E.1.
Lemma 1. Tren(PG0 , T0, ∅ ≤ ∅) is a suitable renaming of P
GT0
0 .
We say that R1 subsumes R2 when R2 can be obtained by adding hypotheses to an instance of
R1. In this case, all facts derivable using R2 can also be derived by R1, so R2 can be eliminated.
Formally, subsumption is defined by:
Definition 3 (Subsumption). We say that R1 = H1 ⇒ C1 subsumes R2 = H2 ⇒ C2, and we
write R1 ⊒ R2, if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σC1 = C2 and σH1 ⊆ H2
(multiset inclusion).
We extend subsumption to sets of clauses as follows. Let R1,R2 be two sets of Horn clauses.
We say that R1 ⊒ R2 if for every clause R2 ∈ R2, there exists a clause R1 ∈ R1 such that
R1 ⊒ R2.
The following theorem shows the soundness of our generalized Horn clauses.
Theorem 3. Let Γ0 ⊢ PG0 be a closed well-typed generalized process, and S be a set of names.
Let P ′0 = Tren(P
G








Theorem 3 comes from the combination of two results. First, the translation from generalized
processes to processes commutes with the instrumentation (provided the translation is suitably
renamed using Tren). Second, the translation from instrumented processes to generalized Horn
clauses is sound: as illustrated in Fig. 6, the Horn clauses obtained by translating the generalized
Horn clauses generated from PG subsume the Horn clauses generated from the translated process
PGT . These results are proved in Appendix E.2.
Furthermore, if R1 ⊒ R2 and a fact F is derivable from R1, then it is also derivable from
R2. So, by Theorems 1, 2, and 3 and Lemma 1, we obtain:
Corollary 1 (Secrecy). Let MG be a term. Let pG be the clause term obtained by replacing
names a with a[ ] and names ai with ai[ ] in M





∪ Fme for any Fme, then for all environments T , P
GT0
0 preserves the
secrecy of MGT from adversaries with initial knowledge S.





∪ Fme, then m-event(e′(p)) ∈ Fme. Then P
GT0
0 satisfies the correspondence “if e(x)
has been executed, then e′(x) has been executed” against adversaries with initial knowledge S.
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The hypotheses of these two corollaries are precisely those that can be proved by applying





by [6, Corollaries 3 and 4]. So by combining the results of this paper with [6], we can prove
secrecy and authentication for protocols that use lists of any length.
For example, after translating our running example into generalized Horn clauses, we can run
the tool developed in [6] and obtain that the hypothesis of Corollary 2 holds for events e and b.
Therefore, by Corollary 2, the process of Sect. 3.2 satisfies the desired correspondence: if e(x) is
executed, then b(x) has been executed.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a new process calculus, useful to represent protocols that manipulate lists of
unbounded length. We have defined its semantics and provided an automatic translation from
this calculus into generalized Horn clauses. We have proved that this translation is sound. By
combining these results with [6], we obtain an automatic technique for proving secrecy and au-
thentication properties of protocols that manipulate unbounded lists, for an unbounded number
of sessions, represented in a process calculus. Implementing the translation into generalized Horn
clauses is planned for future work.
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ProVerif translates a protocol written in the process calculus into a set of Horn clauses. The
syntax of these clauses is defined as follows.
The terms, named clause terms to distinguish them from the terms that occur in processes,
represent the messages of the protocol. A term p can be a variable x, a name a[p1, . . . , pn], or a
constructor application f(p1, . . . , pn). A variable can represent any term. Instead of representing
each fresh name by a different symbol in the clauses, the fresh names are considered as functions
represented by the clause term a[p1, . . . , pn]. These functions take as arguments the messages
previously received by the principal that creates the name as well as session identifiers, which
are variables that take a different value at each run of the protocol, to distinguish names created
in different runs. As shown in, e.g., [5], this representation of names is a sound approximation.
A fact F = pred(p1, . . . , pn) can be of the following forms: message(p, p
′) means that the
message p′ may appear on channel p; att(p) means that the attacker may have the message p;
m-event(p) represents that the event p must have been executed; event(p) represents that the
event p may have been executed.
A clause F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn ⇒ F means that, if all facts Fi are true, then the conclusion F is also
true. We use R for a clause, H for its hypothesis, and C for its conclusion. The hypothesis of a
clause is considered as a multiset of facts. A clause with no hypothesis ⇒ F is written simply F .
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A.2 Translation from the Process Calculus to Horn Clauses
As explained in [5], ProVerif uses two sets of clauses: the clauses for the attacker and the clauses
for the protocol.
Clauses for the Attacker. Initially the attacker has all the names in a set S, hence the
clauses att(a[ ]) for each a ∈ S. Moreover, the abilities of the attacker are represented by the
following clauses:
att(b[x]) (Rn)
for each constructor f of arity n,
att(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(xn) ⇒ att(f(x1, . . . xn))
(Rf)
for each destructor g, for each rule g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def (g),
att(M1) ∧ · · · ∧ att(Mn) ⇒ att(M)
(Rg)
message(x, y) ∧ att(x) ⇒ att(y) (Rl)
att(x) ∧ att(y) ⇒ message(x, y) (Rs)
Clause (Rn) represents the ability of the attacker to create fresh names: all fresh names that the
attacker may create are represented by the names b[x] for any x. Clauses (Rf) and (Rg) mean
that if the attacker has some terms, than he can apply constructors and destructors to them.
Clause (Rl) means that if the attacker has a channel x then he can listen on it and clause (Rs)
means that the attacker can send messages in all the channels he has.
Clauses for the Protocol. The protocol is represented by a closed process P0. To compute
the clauses, we first rename the bound names of P0 so that they are pairwise distinct and
distinct from free names of P0 and from names that occur in the considered security property.
This renaming is important because bound names are also used as function symbols in terms in
the generated clauses. We make an exception for the new construct P + Q: the bound names
in P need not be distinct from those in Q. Using the same symbols for both names in P and Q
does not cause problems because P and Q cannot be both executed. We say that the renamed
process, denoted P ′0, is a suitable renaming of P0.
Next, we instrument the process P ′0 by labeling each replication !P with a distinct session
identifier s, so that it becomes !sP , and labeling each restriction (νa) with the clause term that
corresponds to the fresh name a, a[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ], where x1, . . . , xn are the variables that
store the messages received in inputs above (νa) in P ′0 and s1, . . . , sn′ are the session identifiers
that label replications above (νa) in the instrumentation of P ′0. We denote the instrumentation
of P ′0 by instr(P
′
0).
Then we compute the clauses as follows. Let ρ be a function that associates a clause
term with each name and variable. We extend ρ as a substitution by ρ(f(M1, . . . ,Mn)) =
f(ρ(M1), . . . , ρ(Mn)) if f is a constructor.
The translation [[P ]]ρH of an instrumented process P is a set of clauses, where the environment
ρ is a function defined as above and H is a sequence of facts message(·, ·) and m-event(·). The
empty sequence is ∅ and the concatenation of a fact F to the sequence H is denoted by H ∧ F .
The translation [[P ]]ρH is defined as follows, and explained below.
• [[out(M,N).P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ {H ⇒ message(ρ(M), ρ(N))}.
• [[in(M,x).P ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[x 7→ x])(H ∧message(ρ(M), x)).
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• [[0]]ρH = ∅.
• [[P | Q]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρH .
• [[!sP ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[s 7→ s])H .
• [[(νa : a′[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P ]]ρH =
[[P ]](ρ[a 7→ a′[ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xn), ρ(s1), . . . , ρ(sn′)]])H .
• [[let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q]]ρH =
⋃
{[[P ]]((σρ)[x 7→ σ′p′])(σH) | g(p′1, . . . , p
′
n) →
p′ is in def (g) and (σ, σ′) is a most general pair of substitutions such that σρ(M1) =
σ′p′1, . . . , σρ(Mn) = σ
′p′n} ∪ [[Q]]ρH .
• [[event(e(M)).P ]]ρH =
[[P ]]ρ(H ∧m-event(e(ρ(M)))) ∪ {H ⇒ event(e(ρ(M)))}.
• [[P +Q]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρH .
The translation of an output out(M,N).P adds a clause, meaning that the reception of the
messages in H can produce the output in question. The translation of an input in(M,x).P is
the translation of P with the concatenation of the input to H . The translation of 0 is empty,
as this process does nothing. The translation of the parallel composition P | Q is the union of
the translation of P and Q. The translation of the replication adds the session identifier to ρ;
as the clauses can be applied many times, replication is otherwise ignored. The translation of a
restriction (νa)P is the translation of P in which a is replaced with the corresponding clause term
that depends on previously received messages and on session identifiers of replications above the
restriction. The translation of a destructor application is the union of the translation for the case
where the destructor succeeds and that for the case where it fails, so the translation does not
have to determine whether the destructor succeeds or not, but considers both the possibilities.
We consider that the else branch may always be executed, which overapproximates the possible
behaviors of the process. The translation of an event adds the hypothesis m-event(e(ρ(M))) to H ,
meaning that P can be executed only if the event has been executed first. Furthermore, it adds
a clause, meaning that the event is triggered when all conditions in H are true. The translation
of the choice P + Q is the union of the translation of P and Q, since P + Q behaves either as
P or as Q. The choice was not included in [5]; we have easily extended the proofs of the results
of [5] to the internal choice. (It is also possible to encode P +Q as (νa)(a〈a〉 | a(x).P | a(x).Q)
where a and x do not occur in P and Q. This encoding leads to more complex clauses so we
preferred defining P +Q as a new construct.)
Summary and correctness. Let ρ0 = {a 7→ a[ ] | a ∈ fn(P0)}. The set of the clauses





0)]]ρ0∅ ∪ {att(a[ ]) | a ∈ S} ∪ {(Rn), (Rf), (Rg), (Rl), (Rs)}
where P ′0 is a suitable renaming of P0 and S is the set of names initially known by the attacker.
B Type System for Generalized Horn Clauses
In this section, we recall the type system for generalized Horn clauses of [6, long version], adapting
it to the minor changes we have made to the definition of generalized Horn clauses.
In this type system, the type environment Γ is a list of type declarations:
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i : [1, L] ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ i : [1, L]
(EnvIndex)
φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ ι1 : [1, L1] . . . Γ ⊢ ιh : [1, Lh]




: [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ ι1 : [1, L1] . . . Γ ⊢ ιh : [1, Lh]
Γ ⊢ xι1,...,ιh
(Var)
Γ ⊢ pG1 . . . Γ ⊢ p
G
h




Γ ⊢ pG1 . . . Γ ⊢ p
G
n Γ ⊢ ι1 : [1, L1] . . . Γ ⊢ ιh : [1, Lh]
Γ ⊢ aL1,...,Lhι1,...,ιh [p
G




Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ pG
Γ ⊢ list(i ≤ L, pG)
(List)


















∀j ≤ n,Γ ⊢ FGj
Γ ⊢ FG1 ∧ · · · ∧ F
G
n
∀j ≤ n,Γ ⊢ Ej
Γ ⊢ {E1, . . . , En}
Γ ⊢ HG Γ ⊢ E Γ ⊢ FG
Γ ⊢ HG ∧ E ⇒ FG
Figure 7: Type system for generalized Horn clauses
• i : [1, L] means that i is of type [1, L], that is, intuitively, the value of index i can vary
between 1 and the value of the bound L;
• φ : [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] means that the function φ expects as input h indices of
types [1, Lj], for j = 1, . . . , h and computes an index of type [1, L];
• x
_
: [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] means that the variable x expects indices of types [1, L1], . . . ,
[1, Lh].
The type rules are given in Figure 7. The type system defines the judgments:
• Γ ⊢ ι : [1, L], which means that ι has type [1, L] in the type environment Γ, by rules
(EnvIndex) and (Index);
• Γ ⊢ pG, Γ ⊢ FG, Γ ⊢ E, Γ ⊢ HG, Γ ⊢ E , Γ ⊢ RG, which mean that pG, FG, E, HG, E , RG,
respectively, are well-typed in the type environment Γ.
Most type rules are straightforward. For instance, the rule (Var) means that xi1,...,ih is well-typed
when the types expected by x for its indices match the types of i1, . . . , ih. In the rule (Name),
the type of the index ι of aMι is [1,M ].
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C Translation from Generalized Horn Clauses to Horn
Clauses
A generalized Horn clause represents several Horn clauses: for each value of the bounds L,
functions φ, and free indices i that occur in a generalized Horn clause RG, RG corresponds to
a certain Horn clause. This correspondence gives the formal semantics of the generalized Horn
clauses. It was originally defined in [6]; this section recalls it.
Definition 4. Given a well-typed generalized Horn clause Γ ⊢ RG, an environment T for Γ ⊢ RG
is a function that associates:
• to each bound L that appears in RG or Γ an integer LT ;
• to each index i such that i : [1, L] ∈ Γ, an index iT ∈ {1, . . . , LT };
• to each index function φ such that φ : [1, L1] × · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] ∈ Γ, a function
φT : {1, . . . , LT1 } × · · · × {1, . . . , L
T
h } → {1, . . . , L
T }.
Given an environment T for Γ ⊢ RG, the generalized Horn clause RG is translated into the
standard Horn clause RGT defined as follows. We denote respectively pGT , ET , . . . the translation
of pG, E, . . . using the environment T .




iT if ι = i
φT (ιT1 , . . . , ι
T
h ) if ι = φ(ι1, . . . , ιh)






f(pG1 , . . . , p
G
n )

















[pGT1 , . . . , p
GT
n ]















is considered as a name
function symbol a. (There is a different symbol for each value of the indices ιT1 , . . . , ι
T
h and
bounds LT1 , . . . , L
T
h .) The translation of list(i ≤ L, p
G) is a list of length LT .
Given a conjunction C =
∧
(i1,...,ih)∈[1,L1]×···×[1,Lh]
and an environment T , we define the set
of environments T C = {T [i1 7→ v1, . . . , ih 7→ vh] | vj ∈ {1, . . . , LTj } for j = 1, . . . , h}: these
environments map the indices ij of the conjunction to all their possible values in {1, . . . , LTj },
and map all other values like T .
The translation of a fact FG = C pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ) is
(C pred(pG1 , . . . , p
G
l ))
T = F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fk
where {F1, . . . , Fk} = {pred(pGT
′
1 , . . . , p
GT ′
l ) | T
′ ∈ T C} and (FG1 ∧· · ·∧F
G
n )
T = FGT1 ∧· · ·∧F
GT
n .








| T ′ ∈ T C}.
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Given a set of equations {p1 = p′1, . . . , pn = p
′
n} over standard clause terms, we define as
usual its most general unifier mgu ({p1 = p′1, . . . , pn = p
′
n}) as a most general substitution σ
such that σpi = σp
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, dom(σ) ∪ fv (im(σ)) ⊆ fv (p1, p
′
1, . . . , pn, p
′
n), and
dom(σ) ∩ fv (im(σ)) = ∅, where fv(p) designates the (free) variables of p, dom(σ) is the domain
of σ: dom(σ) = {x | σx 6= x}, and im(σ) is the image of σ: im(σ) = {σx | σx 6= x}. We denote
by {x1 7→ p1, . . . , xn 7→ pn} the substitution that maps xi to pi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, we define the translation of the generalized Horn clause RG = HG ∧ E ⇒ pred(pG1 ,
. . . , pGl ) as follows. If the unification of E
T fails, then RGT is undefined. Otherwise, RGT =
mgu (ET )HGT ⇒ mgu (ET )pred(pGT1 , . . . , p
GT
l ).
When RG is a set of well-typed generalized Horn clauses (i.e., a set of pairs of a type envi-
ronment Γ and a clause RG such that Γ ⊢ RG), we define RGT = {RGT | Γ ⊢ RG ∈ RG, T is
an environment for Γ ⊢ RG and RGT is defined}, the set of all Horn clauses corresponding to
clauses in RG.
D Type System for Generalized Processes
The type rules are given in Fig. 8. The type system defines the following judgments:
• Γ ⊢ ι : [1, L], which means that ι has type [1, L] in the type environment Γ;
• Γ ⊢ MG, Γ ⊢ PG, which mean that MG, PG, respectively, are well-typed in the type
environment Γ.
• i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ patG  Γ, which means that the pattern patG has free indices
i1, . . . , ih of types [1, L1], . . . , [1, Lh] respectively, and binds the variables in Γ.
Most type rules are straightforward. For instance, the rule (Var) means that xi1,...,ih is well-typed
when the types expected by x for its indices match the types of i1, . . . , ih. The rules (PatVar),
(PatData), and (PatList) deal with the patterns xi1,...,ih , f(pat
G
1 , . . . , pat
G
n ), and list(i ≤ L, pat
G),
respectively. They build the type environment that gives types to the variables bound in the
pattern.
E Proofs
We write P ≡α Q when the process P is equal to Q up to renaming of bound names: in an
instrumented process (νa : a′[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P , the name a can be renamed, but the
function symbol a′ remains unchanged. This is why we may end up with instrumented processes
in which the name a is different from the function symbol a′.
E.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is an immediate consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Γ ⊢ PG be a well-typed generalized process, such that the bound names of PG
are pairwise distinct and distinct from free names of PG. Given an environment T for Γ ⊢ PG,
and a list of indices ĩ ≤ L̃, we have:
Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) ≡α P
GT .
Furthermore, we have the following two properties:
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i : [1, L] ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ i : [1, L]
φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ ι1 : [1, L1] . . . Γ ⊢ ιh : [1, Lh]
Γ ⊢ φ(ι1, . . . , ιh) : [1, L]
x
_
: [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ ι1 : [1, L1] . . . Γ ⊢ ιh : [1, Lh]
Γ ⊢ xι1,...,ιh
(Var)
Γ ⊢ MG1 . . . Γ ⊢ M
G
n









: [1, L] ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ ι : [1, L]
Γ ⊢ aι
Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ MG
Γ ⊢ list(i ≤ L,MG)
Γ ⊢ MG Γ ⊢ NG Γ ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ out(MG, NG).PG
Γ ⊢ MG Γ, x
_
: [ ] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ in(MG, x).PG
Γ ⊢ 0
Γ ⊢ PG Γ ⊢ QG
Γ ⊢ PG | QG
Γ ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ !PG








: [1, L] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG




Γ, i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ MGn
Γ, x
_
: [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ QG
let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, xi1,...,ih = g(M
G
1 , . . .M
G
n ) in P
G else QG
i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih[1, Lh] ⊢ xi1,...,ih  (x_ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh])(PatVar)
for all j ≤ n, we have i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ patGj  Γj
i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ f(patG1 , . . . , pat
G
n ) Γ1, . . . ,Γn
(PatData)
i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh], i : [1, L] ⊢ pat
G
 Γ
i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ list(i ≤ L, patG) Γ
(PatList)
i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ patG  Γ′
Γ, i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ MG
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ QG
let for all i1 ≤ L1, . . . , ih ≤ Lh, pat
G = MG in PG else QG
Γ ⊢ MG Γ ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ event(e(MG)).PG
Γ ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ choose L in PG
Γ, k : [1, L] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ choose k ≤ L in PG
Γ, φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ choose φ : [1, L1]× · · · × [1, Lh] → [1, L] in PG
Figure 8: Type system for the generalized process calculus
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P1. The bound names in Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) are pairwise distinct and distinct from free names,
except that in processes P +Q, the bound names in P need not be distinct from those in Q.
P2. All bound names in Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) are of the form aL̃
T ,...
ĩT ,...
when they come from (νa)
in PG and of the form aL
T ,L̃T ,...
v,̃iT ,...
when they come from (for all i ≤ L, νai) in PG.
Proof. The property Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃) ≡α PGT is proved by an easy induction on the syntax
of PG.
Properties P1 and P2 are proved by simultaneous induction on the syntax of PG.
• Case Πi≤LP
G: for each v ≤ LT , by induction hypothesis, the bound names in Tren(PG,
T [i 7→ v], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)) are pairwise distinct (except that in processes P +Q, the bound
names in P need not be distinct from those in Q) and distinct from free names. Further-
more, they are of the form aL̃
T ,LT ,...
ĩT ,v,...
when they come from (νa) in PG and of the form
aL
′T ,L̃T ,LT ,...
v′ ,̃iT ,v,...
when they come from (for all i′ ≤ L′, νai′) in P
G, so P2 holds. Hence the
names Tren(PG, T [i 7→ v], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)) are distinct from the names in Tren(PG, T [i 7→
v′], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)) when v 6= v′, so P1 holds.
• Case (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG: by induction hypothesis, the bound names in Tren(PG, T, ĩ
≤ L̃) are pairwise distinct (except that in processes P + Q, the bound names in P need








come from (for all i ≤ L, νa′i) in P
G. The new bound names aL
T ,L̃T
v,̃iT
for v ≤ LT are of the
required form, so P2 holds. They are distinct from the free names and from the bound
names of Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃), since the bound names in (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG are pairwise
distinct and distinct from free names, so they do not use the same symbol a. So P1 holds.
• The case (νa)PG is similar to the previous one. All other cases follow easily using the
induction hypothesis. We use the property that the bound names of PG are pairwise
distinct and distinct from free names of PG. In the cases “choose”, we also use that in
processes P + Q, the bound names in P need not be distinct from those in Q, so the
induction hypothesis already guarantees that names are distinct when desired.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 3
As explained in Sect. 5, Theorem 3 comes from the combination of two different results. The
first result (Lemma 5) shows that the translation from generalized processes to processes com-
mutes with the instrumentation (provided the translation is suitably renamed using Tren). The
second result (Lemma 11) shows the soundness of the translation from instrumented processes
to generalized Horn clauses.
E.2.1 Instrumentation
We first define the instrumentation of processes and generalized processes more formally by
induction on the syntax of the processes, as follows.
Definition 5. Given a process P , a list of variables Vars = x1, . . . , xn, and a list of session
identifiers SessId = s1, . . . , sn′ , we define the instrumented process as follows:
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• instr(in(M,x).P,Vars , SessId) = in(M,x).instr(P, (Vars , x), SessId);
• instr(!P,Vars , SessId) = !sinstr(P,Vars , (SessId , s));
• instr((νa)P,Vars , SessId) = (νa : a[Vars, SessId ])instr(P,Vars , SessId);
• In all other cases, the same instrumentation is applied recursively on the subprocesses. For
instance, instr(P | Q,Vars, SessId) = instr(P,Vars , SessId) | instr(Q,Vars, SessId).
We let instr(P ) = instr(P, ∅, ∅).
Definition 6. Given a generalized process PG, a list of variables Vars = x1, . . . , xn, a list of
session identifiers SessId = s1, . . . , sn′ , and a list of indices ĩ ≤ L̃, we define the instrumented
generalized process as follows:
• instrG(in(MG, x).PG,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) =
in(MG, x).instrG(PG, (Vars , x), SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃);
• instrG(!PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) = !sinstrG(PG,Vars , (SessId , s), ĩ ≤ L̃);
• instrG(Πi≤LP
G,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) =
Πi≤Linstr
G(PG,Vars, SessId , (̃i, i ≤ L̃, L));
• instrG((for all i ≤ L, νai)PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) =
(for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[Vars, SessId ])instrG(P,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃);
• instrG((νa)PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) =
(νa : aL̃
ĩ
[Vars , SessId ])instrG(PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃);
• In all other cases, the same instrumentation is applied recursively on the subprocesses.
For instance, instrG(PG | QG,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) = instrG(PG,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃) |
instrG(QG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃).
We let instrG(PG) = instrG(PG, ∅, ∅, ∅ ≤ ∅).
We define a type system for instrumented generalized processes. The type rules are defined
similarly to the type rules for generalized processes; the three rules that differ are the ones for
replication and for restriction, which are defined as follows:
Γ, s_ : [ ] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ !sPG
Γ ⊢ ĩ : L̃ Γ ⊢ x1 . . . Γ ⊢ xn Γ ⊢ s1 . . . Γ ⊢ sn′ Γ, a_ : [ ] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ (νa : aL̃
ĩ
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])PG
Γ ⊢ ĩ : L̃ Γ ⊢ x1 . . . Γ ⊢ xn Γ ⊢ s1 . . . Γ ⊢ sn′ Γ, a_ : [1, L] ⊢ PG
Γ ⊢ (for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])PG
We show that, if a non-instrumented process is well-typed, then the corresponding instrumented
process is also well-typed, as follows:
Lemma 3. Let PG be a non-instrumented process. If Γ ⊢ PG, Γ ⊢ x1, . . . , Γ ⊢ xn, and Γ ⊢ ĩ : L̃,
then Γ, s1 : [ ], . . . , sn′ : [ ] ⊢ instr
G(PG, (x1, . . . , xn), (s1, . . . , sn′), ĩ ≤ L̃).
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Proof. By induction on the syntax of PG.
As an immediate corollary, we obtain:
Corollary 3. Let PG0 be a closed non-instrumented process. If Γ0 ⊢ P
G
0 , then Γ0 ⊢ instr
G(PG0 ).
The translation PGT on instrumented processes is defined similarly to the translation on
non-instrumented processes; the cases that differ are as follows:
• (!sPG)T = !sPGT
• ((νa : a′
L̃
ĩ
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G)T = (νa : a′
L̃T
ĩT
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
GT
• ((for all i ≤ L, νai : a′
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P




[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . ,




[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
GT
Lemma 4. Given a well-typed generalized process Γ ⊢ PG, an environment T for Γ ⊢ PG, a
list of variables Vars = x1, . . . xn, a list of session identifiers SessId = s1, . . . , sn′ , and a list of
indices ĩ ≤ L̃, we have:
(instrG(PG,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T ≡α instr(Tren(P
G, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId) .
Proof. This proof is done by structural induction on the process PG. We detail here the most
interesting cases.
• Case in(MG, x).PG:
(instrG(in(MG, x).PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= (in(MG, x).instrG(PG, (Vars , x), SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= in(MGT , x).(instrG(PG, (Vars , x), SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
≡α in(M
GT , x).instr(Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃), (Vars , x), SessId) by induction hypothesis
≡α instr(in(M
GT , x).Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId)
≡α instr(Tren(in(M
G, x).PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId)
• Case !PG:
(instrG(!PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= (!sinstrG(PG,Vars, (SessId , s), ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= !s(instrG(PG,Vars, (SessId , s), ĩ ≤ L̃))T
≡α !
sinstr(Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars, (SessId , s)) by induction hypothesis
≡α instr(!Tren(P
G, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId)
≡α instr(Tren(!P




G,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= (Πi≤Linstr
G(PG,Vars , SessId , (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)))T
= (instrG(PG,Vars, SessId , (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)))T [i7→1] | · · · |
(instrG(PG,Vars , SessId , (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)))T [i7→L
T ]
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For each v ≤ LT , we have by induction hypothesis:
instrG(PG,Vars , SessId , (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L))T [i7→v] ≡α
instr(Tren(PG, T [i 7→ v], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)),Vars , SessId).
Hence:
(instrG(Πi≤LP
G,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
≡α instr(Tren(P
G, T [i 7→ 1], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)),Vars, SessId) | · · · |
instr(Tren(PG, T [i 7→ LT ], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)),Vars , SessId)
≡α instr(Tren(P
G, T [i 7→ 1], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)) | · · · |
Tren(PG, T [i 7→ LT ], (̃i, i) ≤ (L̃, L)),Vars , SessId)
≡α instr(Tren(Πi≤LP
G, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId)
• Case (for all i ≤ L, νai)PG:
(instrG((for all i ≤ L, νai)P
G,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T




instrG(PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
= (νa1 : a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT
[Vars , SessId ]) . . . (νaLT : a
LT ,L̃T
LT ,̃iT
[Vars , SessId ])
(instrG(PG,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
Moreover, by induction hypothesis, (instrG(PG,Vars , SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T ≡α instr(Tren(PG,
T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId). Therefore,
(instrG((for all i ≤ L, νai)P
G,Vars, SessId , ĩ ≤ L̃))T
≡α (νa1 : a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT

















[Vars , SessId ])
(instr(Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId){aL
T ,L̃T
1,̃iT








) . . . (νaL
T ,L̃T
LT ,̃iT
)Tren(PG, T, ĩ ≤ L̃){aL
T ,L̃T
1,̃iT





≡α instr(Tren((for all i ≤ L, νai)P
G, T, ĩ ≤ L̃),Vars , SessId)
• The case (νa)PG can be handled similarly to the previous case. All other cases follow
easily from the induction hypothesis.




0 , T0, ∅ ≤ ∅)) .
Proof. This result comes immediately from Lemma 4 applied to instrG(PG0 ) = instr
G(PG0 , ∅, ∅,
∅ ≤ ∅).
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E.2.2 Translation from Instrumented Processes to Clauses
We use the following standard result.
Lemma 6. Let E1, E2 be two sets of equations over standard clause terms. Then mgu (E1 ∪ E2)
is defined if and only if mgu (mgu (E2)E1)mgu (E2) is defined, and
mgu (E1 ∪ E2) = mgu (mgu (E2)E1)mgu (E2) .
Lemma 7. Let P be an instrumented process, ρ a function that associates a clause term with
each name and variable, and H a sequence of facts. Given a substitution σ over the variables in
ρ, we have that:
[[P ]](σρ)(σH) ⊑ [[P ]]ρH .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is done by structural induction on the process P . We detail here
the most interesting cases.
• Case M(x).P :
[[M(x).P ]](σρ)(σH)
= [[P ]]((σρ)[x 7→ x])(σH ∧message(σρ(M), x))
= [[P ]](σ′(ρ[x 7→ x]))(σ′(H ∧message(ρ(M), x)))
where we define the substitution σ′ = σ[x 7→ x]
⊑ [[P ]](ρ[x 7→ x])(H ∧message(ρ(M), x)) by induction hypothesis
⊑ [[M(x).P ]]ρH
• Case let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q:
[[let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q]](σρ)(σH)
= [[Q]](σρ)(σH) ∪
⋃









is in def (g) and (σ1, σ
′
1) is a most general pair of substitutions




i, for each i = 1, . . . n}
By induction hypothesis, we have [[Q]](σρ)(σH) ⊑ [[Q]]ρH . Let g(p′1, . . . , p
′
n) → p
′ be a rule
in def (g), and (σ1, σ
′









1. For each i = 1, . . . , n, we have σ2ρ(Mi) =
σ′2p
′
i. Let (σ3, σ
′





i. As (σ2, σ
′
2) is such a pair (but maybe not a most general one), there exists




3. Hence we have that
















by induction hypothesis. Therefore,
[[let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q]](σρ)(σH)
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪
⋃









is in def (g) and (σ3, σ
′
3) is a most general pair of substitutions




i, for each i = 1, . . . n}
⊑ [[let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q]]ρH.
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• The other cases are straightforward using the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 8. We have
[[let E1 in . . . let El in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′




• for each i ≤ l, Ei is xi = gi(Mi,1, . . . ,Mi,ni);
• for each i ≤ l, xi does not occur in Q nor in Mk,j for all k = 1, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . , nk;
• for each i ≤ l, gi(p0i,1, . . . , p
0
i,ni
) → p′0i is the rewriting rule of gi and pi,1, . . . , pi,ni , p
′
i are
obtained by renaming p0i,1, . . . , p
0
i,ni
, p′0i with fresh variables;
• E = {ρ(Mk,j) = pk,j | k = 1, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . , nk}.
When the equations in E cannot be unified, mgu (E) is not defined, and the second component of
the union is omitted.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on l.
• Base case: l = 1.
[[let E1 in P else Q]]ρH = [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](σρ[x1 7→ σp
′
1])(σH)
where σ is a most general substitution such that σρ(M1,j) = σp1,j for each j = 1, . . . , n1,
assuming that σ exists. (Finding such a σ is equivalent to finding a most general pair of
substitutions (σ′, σ′′) such that σ′ρ(M1,j) = σ
′′p01,j : we can define σ by σx = σ
′′α−1x where
α is the renaming of p0i,j into pi,j and x is a fresh variable introduced by this renaming,
and σx = σ′x otherwise.) Hence σ = mgu (E) where E = {ρ(M1,j) = p1,j | j = 1, . . . , n1}
and we can conclude that
[[let E1 in P else Q]]ρH = [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′
1]))(mgu (E)H)
When mgu (E) is not defined, that is, σ does not exist, the second component of the union
is omitted.
• Inductive step. We have
[[let E1 in let E2 in . . . let El in P else Q . . . else Q else Q]]ρH
= [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[let E2 in . . . let El in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρ1H1
where ρ1 = mgu (E1)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′
1]), H1 = mgu (E1)H , and
E1 = {ρ(M1,j) = p1,j | j = 1, . . . , n1}, by the base case
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρ1H1 ∪
[[P ]](mgu (E2)(ρ1[x2 7→ p
′
2, . . . , xl 7→ p
′
l]))(mgu (E2)H1)
where E2 = {ρ1(Mk,j) = pk,j | k = 2, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . , nk}, by induction hypothesis,
assuming that mgu (E1) and mgu (E2) are defined. We have
[[Q]]ρ1H1 = [[Q]](mgu (E1)ρ)(mgu (E1)H)
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since x1 does not occur in Q, so [[Q]]ρ1H1 ⊑ [[Q]]ρH by Lemma 7.
Let E ′2 = {ρ(Mk,j) = pk,j | k = 2, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . , nk}. The variables of pk,j (k ≥ 2)




mgu (E2)mgu (E1) = mgu (mgu (E1)E
′
2)mgu (E1) = mgu (E1 ∪ E
′
2) = mgu (E)
by Lemma 6. Moreover, the variables of p′2, . . . , p
′
l are fresh, so they are untouched by
mgu (E1). Hence
mgu (E2)(ρ1[x2 7→ p
′
2, . . . , xl 7→ p
′
l])
= mgu (E2)mgu (E1)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′
1, x2 7→ p
′
2, . . . , xl 7→ p
′
l])
= mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′
1, . . . , xl 7→ p
′
l])
and mgu (E2)H1 = mgu (E2)mgu (E1)H = mgu (E)H . Therefore,
[[let E1 in let E2 in . . . let El in P else Q . . . else Q else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ p
′
1, . . . , xl 7→ p
′
l]))(mgu (E)H)
As before, when mgu (E) is not defined, that is, mgu (E2)mgu (E1) is not defined, the second
component of the union is omitted.
From this lemma, we obtain the following result for the special case of the decomposition of
data constructors.
Corollary 4. Let f be a data constructor of arity n and f−11 , . . . , f
−1
n be its associated destruc-
tors.
[[let x1 = f
−1
1 (M) in . . . let xn = f
−1
n (M) in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn]))(mgu (E)H)
where x1, . . . , xn do not occur in Q nor in M , and E = {f(v1, . . . , vn) = ρ(M)}. When mgu (E)
is not defined, the second component of the union is omitted.
Proof. By Lemma 8, we obtain
[[let x1 = f
−1
1 (M) in . . . let xn = f
−1
n (M) in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E ′)(ρ[x1 7→ v1,1, . . . , xn 7→ vn,n]))(mgu (E
′)H)
where E ′ = {ρ(M) = f(vk,1, . . . , vk,n) | k = 1, . . . , n} and the variables vk,j (k = 1, . . . , n,
j = 1, . . . , n) are fresh. We have mgu (E ′)vk,j = mgu (E ′)vk′,j for all k, k′, j, so for all j = 1, . . . , n,
we can rename the variables vk,j for all k into the same variable vj . After this renaming, we
obtain the announced result.
Lemma 9. Suppose that the variables of pat1, . . . , patn are pairwise distinct and fresh (that is,
they do not occur in ρ, H, M1, . . . , Mn, and Q).
[[let pat1 = M1 in . . . let patn = Mn in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn]))(mgu (E)H)
where E = {pat i = ρ(Mi) | i = 1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the total size of the patterns pat1, . . . , patn.
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• Case 1: there is a single pattern pat = x.
[[let x = M in P else Q]]ρH
= [[let x = id(M) in P else Q]]ρH
= [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu ({ρ(M) = y})(ρ[x 7→ y]))(mgu ({ρ(M) = y})H)
where y is a fresh variable and the rewrite rule for destructor
id is renamed into id(y) → y (see the base case of Lemma 8).
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]](mgu ({ρ(M) = x})(ρ[x 7→ x]))(mgu ({ρ(M) = x})H)
by renaming x into y since x and y do not occur in ρ, ρ(M),
and H .
• Case 2: there is a single pattern pat = f(pat1, . . . , patn).
[[let f(pat1, . . . , patn) = M in P else Q]]ρH
= [[let x1 = f
−1
1 (M) in . . . let xn = f
−1
n (M) in
let pat1 = x1 in . . . let patn = xn in P else Q . . . else Q
else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
where x1, . . . , xn are fresh variables
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[let pat1 = x1 in . . . let patn = xn in P else Q . . . else Q]]
(mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn]))(mgu (E)H)
where E = {f(v1, . . . , vn) = ρ(M)}, by Corollary 4
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρ′H ′ ∪
[[P ]](mgu (E ′)(ρ′[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn]))(mgu (E
′)H ′)
where ρ′ = mgu (E)(ρ[x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn]), H ′ = mgu (E)H , and E ′ = {pat1 =
ρ′(x1), . . . , patn = ρ
′(xn)}, by induction hypothesis (since the total size of pat1, . . . , patn is
less than the size of f(pat1, . . . , patn)).
As x1, . . . , xn do not appear in Q, [[Q]]ρ
′H ′ = [[Q]](mgu (E)ρ)(mgu (E)H) ⊑ [[Q]]ρH , by
Lemma 7.
We have E ′ = {pat i = mgu (E)vi | i = 1, . . . , n} = mgu (E){pat i = vi | i = 1, . . . , n}, so by
Lemma 6,
mgu (E ′)mgu (E) = mgu ({f(v1, . . . , vn) = ρ(M)} ∪ {pat i = vi | i = 1, . . . , n})
= mgu ({f(pat1, . . . , patn) = ρ(M)} ∪ {pat i = vi | i = 1, . . . , n}) .
Let E ′′ = {f(pat1, . . . , patn) = ρ(M)}. Then we have
mgu (E ′)mgu (E) = (mgu (E ′′))[vi 7→ mgu (E
′′)pat i] .
Therefore we obtain that:
[[let f(pat1, . . . , patn) = M in P else Q]]ρH ⊑ [[Q]]ρH
∪ [[P ]](mgu (E ′′)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn]))(mgu (E
′′)H)
since the variables v1, . . . , vn do not occur in ρ and H , and the variables x1, . . . , xn can be
removed from the environment since they do not occur in P .
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• Case 3: there are several patterns.
[[let pat1 = M1 in . . . let patn = Mn in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[let pat2 = M2 in . . . let patn = Mn in P else Q . . . else Q]]
(mgu (E1)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1]))(mgu (E1)H)
where E1 = {pat1 = ρ(M1)}, by induction hypothesis applied to pat1
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρ′H ′ ∪
[[P ]](mgu (E2)(ρ
′[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat2, . . . , patn]))(mgu (E2)H
′)
where ρ′ = mgu (E1)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1]), H
′ = mgu (E1)H , and E2 = {pat i =
ρ′(Mi) | i = 2, . . . , n}, by induction hypothesis applied to pat2, . . . , patn.
Since the variables of pat1 do not occur in the process Q, we have
[[Q]]ρ′H ′ = [[Q]](mgu (E1)ρ)(mgu (E1)H) ⊑ [[Q]]ρH
by Lemma 7.
Let E ′2 = {pat i = ρ(Mi) | i = 2, . . . , n} and E = {pat i = ρ(Mi) | i = 1, . . . , n}.
Since the variables of pat i for i ≥ 2 do not occur in E1, we have mgu (E2)mgu (E1) =
mgu (mgu (E1)E ′2)mgu (E1) = mgu (E1 ∪ E
′
2) = mgu (E) by Lemma 6. So
mgu (E2)(ρ
′[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat2, . . . , patn])
= mgu (E2)mgu (E1)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn])
= mgu (E)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn])
and mgu (E2)H ′ = mgu (E2)mgu (E1)H = mgu (E)H . Therefore,
[[let pat1 = M1 in . . . let patn = Mn in P else Q . . . else Q]]ρH ⊑ [[Q]]ρH
∪ [[P ]](mgu (E)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat1, . . . , patn]))(mgu (E)H)
We introduce the notation ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, which means that the environment ρG is well-typed in
the type environment ΓP for generalized processes and the type environment Γ for generalized
Horn clauses, and that these two type environments are compatible. Formally, ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG means
that
• for each mapping x̃i 7→ p
G in ρG, if ΓP ⊢ x_ : L̃, then Γ, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ pG;
• for each mapping a 7→ pG in ρG, we have Γ ⊢ pG;
• for each mapping ai 7→ pG in ρG, if ΓP ⊢ a_ : [1, L], then Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ pG;
• for each declaration i : [1, L] ∈ ΓP , we have i : [1, L] ∈ Γ; and
• for each declaration φ : [1, L1]×· · ·×[1, Lh] → [1, L] ∈ ΓP , we have φ : [1, L1]×· · ·×[1, Lh] →
[1, L] ∈ Γ.
Lemma 10. Let ΓP ⊢ MG be a well-typed pattern, ρG a function that associates a clause term
with each name and variable, possibly with indices, and Γ an environment for generalized Horn
clauses such that ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG. Then Γ ⊢ ρG(MG)
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Proof. We detail here the three interesting cases.
• Case MG = xι̃. Since ΓP ⊢ xι̃, we have two judgments x_ : L̃ ∈ ΓP and ΓP ⊢ ι̃ : L̃.
From the definition of ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, if {x̃i 7→ p
G} ∈ ρG, then Γ, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ pG. Moreover, as
ΓP ⊢ ι̃ : L̃, we have Γ ⊢ ι̃ : L̃. Hence ρG(MG) = pG{ι̃/̃i} and Γ ⊢ ρG(MG).
• Case MG = a. From the definition of ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, if {a 7→ pG} ∈ ρG, then Γ ⊢ pG =
ρG(MG).
• Case MG = aι. Since ΓP ⊢ aι, we have two judgments a_ : [1, L] ∈ ΓP and ΓP ⊢ ι : [1, L].
From the definition of ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, if {ai 7→ pG} ∈ ρG, then Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ pG. Moreover, as
ΓP ⊢ ι : [1, L], we have Γ ⊢ ι : [1, L], using ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG and an induction on the syntax of ι.
Hence ρG(MG) = pG{ι/i} and Γ ⊢ ρG(MG).
We write T ′ext T to mean that T ′ is an extension of the environment T . Given a type
environment ΓP for processes and a type environment Γ for generalized Horn clauses, we define
{x̃i 7→ p
G}T = {xṽ 7→ p
GT [̃i7→ṽ] | ṽ ≤ L̃} when x
_
: L̃ ∈ Γ, {a 7→ pG}T = {a 7→ pGT }, and
{ai 7→ pG}T = {av 7→ pGT [i7→v] | v ≤ L} when a_ : [1, L] ∈ ΓP . We extend this definition
naturally to ρGT .
Lemma 11. Let ΓP ⊢ PG be a well-typed instrumented generalized process, ρG a function that
associates a clause term with each name and variable, possibly with indices, HG a sequence of
facts, E a set of equations, and Γ is an environment for generalized Horn clauses such that:
• Γ ⊢ HG;
• Γ ⊢ E;
• ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG.
Then





and the clauses in [[PG]]ρGHGEΓ are well-typed.
Proof. The proof is done by structural induction on the process PG. Let ρ = mgu (ET )ρGT and







• Case out(MG, NG).PG: The judgment ΓP ⊢ out(MG, NG).PG is derived from ΓP ⊢ MG,
RR n° 8823
38 Miriam Paiola & Bruno Blanchet
ΓP ⊢ NG, and ΓP ⊢ PG.
[[(out(MG, NG).PG)T ]]ρH
= [[out(MGT , NGT ).PGT ]]ρH
= [[PGT ]]ρH ∪ {(mgu (ET )HGT
⇒ message(mgu (ET )ρGT (MGT ),mgu (ET )ρGT (NGT ))}









({Γ ⊢ HG ∧ E ⇒ message(ρG(MG), ρG(NG))})T
′






The clause Γ ⊢ HG∧E ⇒ message(ρG(MG), ρG(NG)) is well-typed because Γ ⊢ HG, Γ ⊢ E ,
and by Lemma 10, since ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, ΓP ⊢ MG, and ΓP ⊢ NG, we have Γ ⊢ ρG(MG) and
Γ ⊢ ρG(NG). The other clauses are well-typed by induction hypothesis.
• Case in(MG, x).PG:
[[(in(MG, x).PG)T ]]ρH = [[in(MGT , x).PGT ]]ρH
= [[PGT ]](ρ[x 7→ x])(H ∧message(ρ(MGT ), x))












where ρG1 = ρ
G[x 7→ x], HG1 = H
G ∧message(ρG(MG), x), and Γ1 = Γ, x_ : [ ]. We show
that ρ[x 7→ x] = mgu (ET )ρGT1 :
mgu (ET )ρGT1 = mgu (E
T )ρGT [x 7→ x] = ρ[x 7→ x]
and H ∧message(ρ(MGT ), x) = mgu (ET )HGT1 :
mgu (ET )HGT1 = mgu (E
T )(HG ∧message(ρG(MG), x))T
= mgu (ET )HGT ∧ mgu (ET )(message(ρGT (MGT ), x)
= H ∧message(mgu (ET )ρGT (MGT ), x)
= H ∧message(ρ(MGT ), x)
The judgment ΓP ⊢ in(MG, x).PG is derived from ΓP ⊢ MG and ΓP , x_ : [ ] ⊢ PG. Let
Γ′P the environment that types P
G, Γ′P = ΓP , x_ : [ ]. Before applying the induction
hypothesis, we need to show that Γ′P ,Γ1 ⊢ ρ
G
1 and Γ1 ⊢ H
G
1 (clearly, Γ1 ⊢ E). Since
ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, we have Γ′P ,Γ1 ⊢ ρ
G. For the new map [x 7→ x] ∈ ρG1 we have that x_ : [ ] ∈ Γ
′
P
and Γ1 ⊢ x. Hence Γ′P ,Γ1 ⊢ ρ
G
1 .
Since Γ ⊢ HG, we have Γ1 ⊢ HG. From Lemma 10, we have that Γ ⊢ ρG(MG), as
ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G and ΓP ⊢ M
G. Finally Γ1 ⊢ x. Hence Γ1 ⊢ message(ρ
G(MG), x), and thus
Γ1 ⊢ HG1 . Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis and conclude.
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• Case 0: [[0T ]]ρH = ∅ =
⋃




• Case PG | QG: The judgment ΓP ⊢ PG | QG is derived from ΓP ⊢ PG and ΓP ⊢ QG.
Hence, using the induction hypothesis, we obtain:
















• Case !sPG: The judgment ΓP ⊢ !
sPG is derived from ΓP , s_ : [ ] ⊢ P
G. Since Γ ⊢ HG,
Γ ⊢ E , and ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, we have a fortiori Γ, s_ : [ ] ⊢ HG, Γ, s_ : [ ] ⊢ E , and (ΓP , s_ :
[ ]), (Γ, s
_
: [ ]) ⊢ ρG[s 7→ s]. Hence, using the induction hypothesis, we obtain:
















G)T ]]ρH = [[PGT [i7→1] | . . . |PGT [i7→L
T ]]]ρH
= [[PGT [i7→1]]]ρH ∪ · · · ∪ [[PGT [i7→L
T ]]]ρH
The judgment ΓP ⊢ Πi≤LPG is derived from ΓP , i : [1, L] ⊢ PG. Since Γ ⊢ HG, Γ ⊢ E , and
ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, we have a fortiori Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ HG, Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ E , and (ΓP , i : [1, L]), (Γ, i :
[1, L]) ⊢ ρG. By induction hypothesis, [[PGT [i7→v]]]ρH ⊑
⋃








T ′ext T [i7→1]
([[PG]]ρGHGE(Γ, i : [1, L]))T
′
∪ · · · ∪
⋃
T ′ext T [i7→LT ]














since T [i 7→ v] is an extension of T for each v ∈ {1, . . . , LT }.
• Case (for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G:
[[((for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G)T ]]ρH
= [[(νa1 : a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT
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where
ρ1 = ρ[a1 7→ a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT




[ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xn), ρ(s1), . . . , ρ(sn′)]] .
The right-hand side of the theorem develops in
⋃
T ′ext T
([[(for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i













[ρG(x1), . . . , ρ
G(xn), ρ
G(s1), . . . , ρ
G(sn′)]].
We show that ρ1 = mgu (ET )ρGT1 :
ρ1 = ρ[a1 7→ a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT




[ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xn), ρ(s1), . . . , ρ(sn′)]]
= mgu (ET )
(ρGT [a1 7→ a
LT ,L̃T
1,̃iT
[ρGT (x1), . . . , ρ
GT (xn), ρ
GT (s1), . . . , ρ
GT (sn′)],
. . . , aLT 7→ a
LT ,L̃T
LT ,̃iT
[ρGT (x1), . . . , ρ
GT (xn), ρ
GT (s1), . . . , ρ
GT (sn′)]])
= mgu (ET )ρGT1
The judgment ΓP ⊢ (for all i ≤ L, νai : a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[x1, . . . , xn, s1, . . . , sn′ ])P
G is derived from
ΓP ⊢ ĩ : L̃, ΓP ⊢ x1, . . . , ΓP ⊢ xn, ΓP ⊢ s1, . . . , ΓP ⊢ sn′ , and ΓP , a_ : [1, L] ⊢ PG. Let
Γ′P the environment that types P
G, Γ′P = ΓP , a_ : [1, L]. Before applying the induction
hypothesis, we need to show that Γ′P ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G
1 . Since ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G, we have Γ′P ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G.
For the new map [ai 7→ a
L,L̃
i,̃i
[ρG(x1), . . . , ρ
G(xn), ρ
G(s1), . . . , ρ
G(sn′)]] ∈ ρG1 , we have that
a
_
: [1, L] ∈ Γ′P . Moreover, since ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G and ΓP ⊢ ĩ : L̃, we have Γ ⊢ ĩ : L̃, so a
fortiori, Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ ĩ : L̃. By Lemma 10, for each j ≤ n, since ΓP ⊢ xj and ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG,
we have Γ ⊢ ρG(xj), so Γ, i : [1, L] ⊢ ρG(xj). By Lemma 10, for each j ≤ n′, since ΓP ⊢ sj




. . . , ρG(xn), ρ
G(s1), . . . , ρ
G(sn′)]. Hence Γ
′
P ,Γ ⊢ ρ
G
1 . We can then apply the induction
hypothesis and conclude.
• Case (νa)PG: This case is similar to the previous one.
• Case let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG: let g(p1, . . . , pn) → p′ be the
rewrite rule for the destructor g. We suppose that the tuples of indices ṽ ≤ L̃T are indexed
by 1, . . . , l, that is, we define {ṽ1, . . . , ṽl} = {1̃, . . . , L̃T}. We let T ′k = T [̃i 7→ ṽk] for
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k = 1, . . . , l.
[[(let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG)T ]]ρH
= [[let E1 in . . . let El in P
GT else QGT . . . else QGT ]]ρH







1 , . . . ,M
GT ′
k
n ) for k = 1, . . . , l.
⊑ [[QGT ]]ρH ∪ [[PGT ]](mgu (E1)(ρ[xṽ1 7→ p
′
1, . . . , xṽl 7→ p
′
l]))(mgu (E1)H)
by Lemma 8, where pk,1, . . . , pk,n, p
′
k are the patterns p1, . . . , pn, p
′ renamed with distinct
fresh variables for each k = 1, . . . , l and E1 = {ρ(M
GT ′
k
j ) = pk,j | k = 1, . . . , l and j =
1, . . . , n}, assuming that mgu (E1) exists. (When mgu (E1) does not exist, the second
component of the union is omitted, and the rest of the proof can easily be adapted.) The
right-hand side of the theorem develops in
⋃
T ′ext T
([[let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G












′G])HG(E ∪ E ′)Γ′)T
′
where E ′ and Γ′ are defined as follows. The rewrite rule g(p′G1 , . . . , p
′G
n ) → p
′G is obtained
from g(p1, . . . , pn) → p′ by replacing all variables y of this rule with fresh variables with in-
dices ĩ: y′
ĩ











and Γ′ is Γ extended with x
_
: L̃ and y′
_
: L̃ for each variable y′
ĩ




We analyze now the relation between mgu (E1) and E ′T . We have
E ′T = {ρGT (M
GT [̃i7→ṽ]
j ) = p
′GT [̃i7→ṽ]
j | ṽ ≤ L̃
T and j = 1, . . . n}.





′G, there is a renaming α such that, for all k =
1, . . . , l, we have αpk,j = p
′GT ′
k




k . Hence we have
mgu (ET )E ′T = {mgu (ET )ρGT (M
GT [̃i7→ṽ]




| ṽ ≤ L̃T and j = 1, . . . n}
= {ρ(M
GT [̃i7→ṽ]
j ) = p
′GT [̃i7→ṽ]
j | ṽ ≤ L̃
T and j = 1, . . . n}
since the variables of p
′GT [̃i7→ṽ]
j are fresh,




j ) = αpk,j | k = 1, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . n}
= αE1
So, by Lemma 6,
mgu (αE1)mgu (E
T ) = mgu (mgu (ET )E ′T )mgu (ET ) = mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )
Hence
mgu (αE1)(ρ[xṽ1 7→ αp
′
1, . . . , xṽl 7→ αp
′
l])
= mgu (αE1)mgu (E
T )(ρGT [x1̃ 7→ p




= mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )(ρG[x̃i 7→ p
′G])T
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Similarly, mgu (αE1)H = mgu (αE1)mgu (ET )HGT = mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )HGT .
The judgment ΓP ⊢ let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG is derived from
ΓP , ĩ : L̃ ⊢ MG1 , . . . , ΓP , ĩ : L̃ ⊢ M
G
n , ΓP , x_ : L̃ ⊢ P
G, and ΓP ⊢ QG. Let Γ′P the
environment that types PG: Γ′P = ΓP , x_ : L̃. Before applying the induction hypothesis,
we need to show that Γ′P ,Γ
′ ⊢ ρG[x̃i 7→ p
′G] and Γ′ ⊢ E ∪ E ′. At first, notice that
p′G1 , . . . , p
′G
n , p
′G are obtained from p1, . . . , pn, p
′ by replacing all variables y with fresh
variables with indices y′
ĩ
and that Γ′ types each variable y′
_
with type L̃. Hence all variables
in p′G1 , . . . , p
′G
n , p
′G are typed by Γ′.
We have that Γ′P ,Γ




: L̃ ∈ Γ′P and Γ
′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ p′G (all variables in p′G are typed by Γ′), we
have Γ′P ,Γ







= ρG(MGj ), j = 1, . . . n we have that:
– Γ′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ ρG(MGj ): this comes from Lemma 10 applied to ΓP , ĩ : L̃ ⊢ M
G
j and
(ΓP , ĩ : L̃), (Γ, ĩ : L̃) ⊢ ρG and from the fact that Γ′ extends Γ.
– Γ′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ p′Gj : all variables in p
′G
j are typed in Γ
′.
This means that each equation in E ′ is well typed in Γ′; moreover Γ′ ⊢ E because Γ′ extends
Γ and Γ ⊢ E by hypothesis. Thus Γ′ ⊢ E ∪ E ′.
We can then apply the induction hypothesis, which yields
[[PGT ]](mgu (αE1)(ρ[xṽ1 7→ αp
′







′G])HG(E ∪ E ′)Γ′)T
′
and [[QGT ]]ρH ⊑
⋃





[[PGT ]](mgu (E1)(ρ[xṽ1 7→ p
′
1, . . . , xṽl 7→ p
′
l]))(mgu (E1)H)
⊑ [[PGT ]](mgu (αE1)(ρ[xṽ1 7→ αp
′
1, . . . , xṽl 7→ αp
′
l]))(mgu (αE1)H)
(These two sets of clauses are in fact equal up to renaming of variables, by construction.)
Hence we can conclude that:
[[(let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG)T ]]ρH ⊑
⋃
T ′ext T
([[let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, x̃i = g(M
G
1 , . . . ,M
G
n ) in P
G else QG]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′
• Case let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, patG = MG in PG else QG: as in the previous case, we suppose that
the tuples of indices ṽ ≤ L̃T are indexed by 1, . . . , l, that is, we define {ṽ1, . . . , ṽl} =
{1̃, . . . , L̃T }.
[[(let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, patG = MG in PG else QG)T ]]ρH
= [[let E1 in . . . let El in P
GT else QGT . . . else QGT ]]ρH
where Ei is the equation pat
GT [̃i7→ṽi] = MGT [̃i7→ṽi].
⊑ [[Q]]ρH ∪ [[P ]]ρ′H ′
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) | T ′′ = T [̃i 7→ ṽ], ṽ ≤ L̃T}, ρ′ =
mgu (E1)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in patGT [̃i7→ṽ], ṽ ≤ L̃T ]), and H ′ = mgu (E1)H , assuming
that mgu (E1) exists. (When mgu (E1) does not exist, the second component of the union
is omitted, and the rest of the proof can easily be adapted.)
The right-hand side of the theorem develops in:
⋃
T ′ext T








[[P ]](ρG[x̃i′ 7→ x̃i′ | x̃i′ occurs in pat
G])HG(E ∪ E ′)Γ′)T
′





= ρG(MG) and Γ′ is Γ extended for the variables occurring in patG.
More precisely, if the typing rule for the process let for all ĩ ≤ L̃, patG = MG in PG else QG
has i1 : [1, L1], . . . , ih : [1, Lh] ⊢ patG  Γ′′ as a premise, then Γ′ = Γ,Γ′′. Hence




) | T ′′ = T [̃i 7→ ṽ], ∀ṽ ≤ L̃T}. Hence we have that:
mgu (ET )E ′T
= {mgu (ET )patGT [̃i7→ṽ] = mgu (ET )ρGT (MGT [̃i7→ṽ]) | ∀ṽ ≤ L̃T }




T ) = mgu (mgu (ET )E ′T )mgu (ET ) = mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )
so
ρ′ = mgu (E1)(ρ[x 7→ x | x occurs in pat
GT [̃i7→ṽi], ṽi ≤ L̃
T ])
= mgu (E1)mgu (E
T )(ρGT [x 7→ x | x occurs in patGT [̃i 7→ṽi], ṽi ≤ L̃
T ])
= mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )(ρG[x̃i′ 7→ x̃i′ | x̃i′ occurs in pat
G])T
Similarly,
H ′ = mgu (E1)H = mgu (E1)mgu (E
T )HGT = mgu ((E ∪ E ′)T )HGT .




G, and ΓP ⊢ QG, where ĩ : L̃ ⊢ patG  Γ′′P . Let Γ
′
P the environment that
types PG: Γ′P = ΓP ,Γ
′′
P . Before applying the induction hypothesis, we need to show that
Γ′P ,Γ
′ ⊢ ρG[x̃i′ 7→ x̃i′ | x̃i′ occurs in pat
G] and Γ′ ⊢ E ∪ E ′.
We have that Γ′P ,Γ




: L̃ ∈ Γ′′P (that is x_ : L̃ ∈ Γ
′
P ) and Γ
′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ x̃i (all variables in
patG are typed by Γ′) then Γ′P ,Γ







= ρG(MG) we have that:
– Γ′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ ρG(MG): this comes from Lemma 10 applied to ΓP , ĩ : L̃ ⊢ MG and
(ΓP , ĩ : L̃), (Γ, ĩ : L̃) ⊢ ρG and from the fact that Γ′ extends Γ.
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– Γ′, ĩ : L̃ ⊢ patG: all variables in pat′G are typed in Γ′.
This means that the equation in E ′ is well typed in Γ′; moreover Γ′ ⊢ E because Γ′ extends
Γ and Γ ⊢ E by hypothesis. Thus Γ′ ⊢ E ∪ E ′.
We can then apply the induction hypothesis:
[[PGT ]]ρ′H ′ ⊑
⋃
T ′ext T
[[P ]](ρG[x̃i′ 7→ x̃i′ | x̃i′ occurs in pat
G])HG(E ∪ E ′)Γ′)T
′
and [[QGT ]]ρH ⊑
⋃
T ′ext T ([[Q
G]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′
. Therefore we can conclude.
• Case event(e(MG)).PG: This case combines the arguments used in the case of input and
in the case of output.
• Case choose L in PG: The judgment ΓP ⊢ choose L in PG is derived from ΓP ⊢ PG.
Hence, using the induction hypothesis, we obtain:
[[(choose L in PG)T ]]ρH
= [[PGT [L 7→1] + · · ·+ PGT [L 7→n] + · · ·]]ρH
= [[PGT [L 7→1]]]ρH ∪ · · · ∪ [[PGT [L 7→n]]]ρH ∪ · · ·
⊑
⋃
T ′ext T [L 7→1]
([[PG]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′
∪ · · · ∪
⋃
T ′ext T [L 7→n]
([[PG]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′




([[choose L in PG]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′
• Case choose k ≤ L in PG: The judgment ΓP ⊢ choose k ≤ L in PG is derived from ΓP , k :
[1, L] ⊢ PG. Since Γ ⊢ HG, Γ ⊢ E , and ΓP ,Γ ⊢ ρG, we have a fortiori Γ, k : [1, L] ⊢ HG,
Γ, k : [1, L] ⊢ E , and (ΓP , k : [1, L]), (Γ, k : [1, L]) ⊢ ρG. Hence, using the induction
hypothesis, we obtain:
[[(choose k ≤ L in PG)T ]]ρH
= [[PGT [k 7→1] + · · ·+ PGT [k 7→L
T ]]]ρH




T ′ext T [k 7→1]
([[PG]]ρGHGE(Γ, k : [1, L]))T
′
∪ · · · ∪
⋃
T ′ext T [k 7→LT ]





([[choose k ≤ L in PG]]ρGHGEΓ)T
′
• Case choose φ : L1 × · · · × Lh → L′ in PG: This case is similar to the previous one.
E.2.3 Combining the results
From the previous results, we easily obtain Theorem 3.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Let PG1 = instr
G(PG0 ). By Corollary 3, Γ0 ⊢ P
G












T0, ∅ ≤ ∅)) ≡α instr
G(PG0 )
T0 = PGT01 , so we have ([[instr
G(PG0 )]]ρ0∅∅∅)
T ⊒ [[instr(P ′0)]]ρ0∅ since
the translation to Horn clauses [[·]] is invariant by renaming of bound names.
Moreover, for each clause R in {att(a[ ]) | a ∈ S} ∪ {(Rn), (Rf), (Rg), (Rl), (Rs)} except the
clauses (Rf) and (Rg) for lists of fixed length, R is also a generalized Horn clause and we have
{R}T = {R}. The clauses (Rf) for lists of fixed length are in {RG}T = {att(x1)∧· · ·∧att(xn) ⇒
att(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) | n ∈ N}, where RG = (Rf-list). The clauses (Rg) for lists of fixed length are in
{RG}T = {att(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) ⇒ att(xv) | n ∈ N, v ≤ n} where RG = (Rg-list).










Domaine de Voluceau, - Rocquencourt
B.P. 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
